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ABSTRACT 
The thesis examines the linkage between budgeting, budget structure and decision 
making, discusses different functions a budget must fulfill and identifies criteria a budget 
structure should meet to support rational decision making. An examination of the most 
common budgeting approaches and the budget formats they use follows. As a result of 
this examination a mission-based program budget format emerges as the most suitable 
format for rational decision making at the top of organizations. 
After identifying missions of the current military strategy, goals of the Estonian 
defense, and the structure of the current defense budget, the thesis analyses the strengths 
and weaknesses of the current defense budget structure and concludes that although it 
scores high on one major budgeting function - control -, it does not support rational 
decision making at the top of Estonian defense establishment. To improve the situation 
the thesis identifies several alternative ways to structure and present budgetary 
information and assesses their strengths and weaknesses. And finally, some suggestions 
for further research conclude the study. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.       BACKGROUND 
After regaining independence in 1991, the Estonian Armed Forces also had to be 
rebuilt. As in Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia did not inherit any military equipment from 
the Soviet Armed Forces. As a result, the Estonian Armed Forces were rebuilt from 
scratch. Initially people could not even agree on whether the Armed Forces were needed 
at all. After the decision to reestablish the Armed Forces had finally been made, their size 
and composition was still under consideration. In the absence of sound analysis and 
considering that the Government did not regard the national defense as a priority, no 
systematic development took place during the first half of the 1990s. The Government 
established military units and procured defense related goods, but thorough analysis 
regarding missions, goals, effectiveness and feasibility was secondary. 
In the middle of the 1990s those questions gradually began to gain more attention 
than before. A formal planning process that linked threat analysis, national priorities and 
resources with the development of military capabilities was established in 1997. 
Although quite clear and easy to do on paper, its implementation has been difficult. 
Although this is not the only reason, the difficulty in linking the current defense budget 
with the defense plans and programs in an acceptable manner has significantly 
contributed to the problem. The current defense budget is based on regulations 
established by the Ministry of Finance, but this structure is not well suited to internal 
decision-making purposes in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and its sphere of 
administration. 
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In early 2001, the Estonian Government adopted the National Military Strategy 
document that will form the basis for the future development of the national defense. The 
strategy gives a number of missions to the Armed Forces. The preparation for them will 
be carried out through the defense planning and budgeting process. According to this 
process, the Estonian MoD writes planning guidance to the General (Joint) Staff of the 
Estonian Defense Forces. The General Staff is responsible for detailed military planning 
and composes its plans and budgets as a response to the ministerial planning guidance. 
These are sent to the Ministry of Defense for review. The author of the thesis has 
participated in analyzing these defense plans and budgets before starting his studies at 
NPS in 1999. A frequently encountered problem was the incompatibility of the military 
plans with the budget proposal. The information was often structured differently, 
allowing little insight into the link between these two documents. In fact, the MoD could 
often see neither the link between the General (Joint) Staff plans and its proposed budgets 
nor the link between General (Joint) Staff budget proposals and ministerial guidance. A 
more detailed description of the Estonian defense planning process and the problems 
associated with the current budget structure are given in the following chapters. 
B.        PURPOSE 
The thesis addresses the problem of an insufficient linkage between the military 
strategy, defense-related development goals, budgets and rational planning and decision 
making. In particular, it focuses on the shortcomings of the current budget structure used 
in the MoD and its sphere of administration. The working hypothesis of the thesis is that 
the current structure of the Estonian defense  budgeti   does not  support rational, 
1 For the purposes of this thesis, the defense budget means the budget of the sphere of administration 
of Estonian Ministry of Defense (MoD). 
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conceptual decision-making by carrying out the missions of the military strategy and 
implementing the development goals in the MoD sphere of administration regarding the 
needs of top-level decision makers. 
The thesis has three objectives. First, it examines the Estonian defense budget 
structure and assesses its strengths and weaknesses. The focus of the analysis is on its 
suitability for rational decision-making in the MoD and top-level military decision 
makers. Second it proposes alternative ways to structure budgetary information that could 
be more suitable for this purpose. The third objective is developing a reference material 
about different budgetary approaches in general and about requirements for structuring 
budgetary information to support top-level decision-making in defense that could serve 
future budget reformers in Estonian national defense. 
C.       SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The thesis includes: 
• A general discussion about decision-making in budgeting, about the 
influence of the budget structure on decisions that can be made in the 
budgetary process and about the criteria a budget structure must meet to 
support making rational decisions 
• A review of the most important budgetary approaches and budget formats 
that have been applied during the 20th century, their strengths and 
weaknesses 
• An in-depth review of program budgets (and budgeting) and mission 
budgeting, 
• A review of the missions of the Estonian Military Strategy, the structure of 
Estonian defense budget and more generally, of the Estonian defense 
planning process 
• An analysis of the Estonian defense budget structure regarding its 
strengths and weaknesses for different purposes, especially regarding its 
suitability for rational decision making 
• Recommendations for structuring budgetary information for Estonian 
defense that would better support rational decision making 
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For the purposes of making the topic manageable, the thesis will not investigate 
the political feasibility of the proposed budgetary changes and the implications of 
implementing the proposed budget structures with the current accounting system in the 
Estonian defense. As these aspects are nevertheless important, further research is 
necessary to ensure that the proposed changes can actually be implemented. 
The research uses unclassified primary (Estonian planning and budgeting 
documents) and secondary (budgetary and planning literature) sources. The author will 
also draw on his own personal experience. Having to leave classified Estonian budgeting 
and planning documents out of consideration is a limitation. 
D.       ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The remainder of the thesis is broken down into six chapters. Chapter II gives the 
overall theoretical foundation to the study and is based on literature review. Chapter III is 
a continuation of the previous chapter and investigates the link between plans and 
budgets in greater depth. Chapter IV gives the background information about the 
Estonian defense and the defense budget for the study. Chapter V analyses the Estonian 
current defense budget structure and Chapter VI gives recommendations for establishing 
alternative budget structures for rational decision making. Chapter VII presents 
conclusions. 
More specifically, Chapter II discusses the connection between budgeting, budget 
structure and decision making, and discusses possible criteria for a budget structure that 
would support rational decision making. The rest of the chapter gives an overview of 
different budgetary approaches, their advantages and disadvantages, and the skills they 
require. 
Chapter III is a logical continuation of Chapter II and discusses how a defense 
plan should be translated into a budget so that the decisions made during that process 
would remain rational. In particular, it focuses on the structural and analytical aspects of 
programming in defense. 
Chapter IV gives Estonia-specific information by naming the current missions of 
the strategy, describing the forces and their broad mid-term goals of development, the 
existing planning and budgeting procedures and gives the structure of the defense budget. 
Chapter V analyzes the current defense budget structure showing its strengths and 
weaknesses, based on the information given in previous chapters. The stress will be on 
the question of whether the current budget structure supports rational decision making or 
not. 
Chapter VI takes the results of the analysis in Chapter V into consideration and 
proposes three alternative ways to the structure budgetary information that would 
strengthen the linkage between the missions of the strategy and defense plans and 
budgets that could facilitate rational planning and decision-making in the Ministry of 
Defense and General (Joint) Staff. 
Chapter VII gives concluding remarks and suggests topics for further research. 
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II.      THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.       BUDGETING AND DECISION MAKING 
Budgeting is a controversial subject. Despite intensive research there is still no 
comprehensive budget theory as was noticed by Key (1978, pp. 19-23). The answer to his 
fundamental question - on what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A 
instead of activity B - is no more clearer today than it was about 60 years ago2. Yet 
public budgeting systems must somehow allow making choices among ends and means 
as Lee and Johnston (1983, p. 1) note3. They further note that this means making political 
decisions that allocate scarce resources among alternative uses. In this sense all budgeting 
systems or processes are also decision-making systems or processes. 
As there is no common criterion for allocating resources, all attempts and ways to 
structure budgetary information for different purposes are arbitrary to a certain extent. 
However, as will be seen later in this chapter some ways to structure budgetary 
information have more utility to certain purposes than for others. There are different 
functions that a budget must fulfill at the same time, and those different functions require 
different kinds of information. This and the lack of the budget theory, are probably the 
most important reasons why there has been so much criticism about the inadequacy of 
budget structures. 
The third reason is probably the limitation of human capabilities. This deserves 
further attention. There are different approaches to decision-making that assume different 
2 Key's article was published first in 1940. 
3 Of course, this applies also to private budgeting systems, but the authors do not discuss this field. 
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abilities of people in analyzing available information and their willingness to do 
comprehensive analysis. Lee and Johnston (1983, pp. 15-20) give three basic theories of 
decision-makings pure rationality, muddling through or incrementalism, and limited 
rationality that are described next. 
The pure rationality approach consists of a series of ordered, logical steps. First, a 
complete specification of an organization's goals is ranked by priority. Then all possible 
alternatives are identified and the costs of each alternative are compared with anticipated 
benefits and the alternative with the highest cost-benefit ratio is chosen. This approach 
assumes that complete and perfect information about all alternatives is both available and 
manageable. The problem is that the applicability of this model is limited. Usually the 
information is incomplete and the costs of getting more accurate information increase at 
an increasing rate. The limited capability (time and mental energy) of decision-makers 
and analysts to consider all possible alternatives is also a serious constraint in this 
approach. Since adding just a few more variables into the analysis exponentially 
increases the number of possible alternatives to be considered, no budgeting approach is 
purely rational, because it is generally impossible to consider all available alternatives in 
the strict sense of the word. 
Muddling through or incrementalism stresses political aspects of decision- 
making, arguing that only incremental adjustments allow establishing consensus among 
relevant participants of decision-making that would be almost impossible under a pure 
4 There are actually more different theories, but the authors group them all into these three broad 
categories. 
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rationality approach. This approach will be described in the further paragraphs, as it is 
also one of the most important budgeting approaches. 
The third approach, limited rationality, lies somewhere in between these 
extremes, but the exact position is difficult to determine. It argues that considering the 
most important alternatives as opposed to all alternatives at the broad, long term planning 
level and incremental analysis of immediate short-term effects of the selected 
alternative(s) is the superior way to make decisions. 
Anshen (1969, pp. 5-6) supports the rational or limited rationality approach by 
noting that in the context of resource allocation, budgeting is concerned with deciding on 
the allocation of scarce and reasonably well-defined inputs to attain well or not-so well- 
defined objectives. He breaks this process down into three parts: the determination of the 
most efficient way to attain given objectives, determination of the optimal set of 
concurrent objectives and determination of the optimal size of the total budget. He 
maintains that a good budget system supports and informs judgment by providing 
relevant information for making these rational decisions. There are three criteria for 
relevancy: 
• Aggregation of information in totals that illuminate meaningful decision 
alternatives and aid rational comparisons among them 
• With respect to each alternative objective, identification and summation of 
all pertinent input requirements, both current and future 
• Organization of information in detail that facilitates the efficiency 
measures of inputs in relation to outputs, means in relation to ends, 
investment in relation to payback (i.e. cost-utility analysis) 
Because the pure rationality approach is unachievable in practice and the limited 
rationality is the next-best approach to rationality, from now on the thesis will use the 
term "rationality" in the sense of "limited rationality" for convenience. A number of 
budgeting approaches, especially program budgeting (and PPBS) and zero-based- 
budgeting, but also performance budgeting satisfy these criteria, although the last two pay 
relatively little attention to the future. The major budgeting approaches will be described 
in the following parts of this chapter. However, the next paragraphs first give the 
rationale why budget structure matters. 
B.        BUDGET STRUCTURE AND DECISION MAKING 
Choosing an adequate budget structure or format is not a trivial exercise. 
Burkhead (1956, pp. viii, 110) recognized that and argued: 
The way in which revenue and expenditure are grouped together for 
decision making is the most important aspect of budgeting... Classification 
is the structural key to conscious and rational government budgeting. The 
manner in which the revenue and expenditure are grouped will be 
determined by, and also will determine, the character of the decisions that 
can be made in the budgetary process. These decisions result from a 
constant interplay of questions and answers among levels in the hierarchy 
of government. The purpose of budget classification is to help focus the 
questions and to clarify and detail the answers. 
The problem of classification is complicated by the fact that there are different 
purposes a budget classification may serves. Burkhead recognized that the search for an 
ideal single classification for the budget is "a mistaken and fruitless search". Instead he 
argues the usefulness of the classification techniques can be judged only in relation to 
their operational character, the ability to facilitate the decision-making that characterizes 
and comprises the various phases of the budget process. He notes that those decisions 
determine the role, scope, and complexity of governmental operations, and the activities, 
which must be classified and budgeted. 
5 The different purposes a budgetary classification may serve are elaborated in later paragraphs. 
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Similarly, Mosher (1954, pp. 5, 83) noted the importance of classification, 
because: 
There are ... a variety of ways to translate information...The ways in 
which it is done importantly affect the kinds of treatment and kinds of 
decisions that can be made at various levels...The way we classify things 
obviously reflects our view of the nature of things; it also conditions our 
subsequent perspectives, understandings, and decisions made within the 
framework of the established classification. 
Additionally, Schick (1978, p. 63) touches on a more specific case of planning, 
programming and budgeting (PPB) and notes that: 
The PPB rests on assumption that the form in which information is 
classified and used governs the actions of budget makers, and conversely, 
that alterations in form will produce desired changes in behavior. 
While these authors just expressed their "conviction" that budget structure 
matters, Grizzle (1986, pp. 60-70) and Pettijohn and Grizzle (1997, pp. 26-45) carried out 
some actual research to see the impact of the budget format on the nature of decisions 
made. They studied the appropriation committees of Florida and North Carolina using 
different budget formats and reanalyzed an earlier study on the U.S. House 
Appropriations subcommittee hearings. They concluded that although the format is not 
the only factor that influences decisions, it still influences "what the conversation will be 
about". This is because whoever controls the budget format sets the decision agenda and 
controls the nature of the debate. Although the research area of these budget researchers 
was focused on the highest levels of budgetary decision-making, the Congress (of the 
U.S. or of different states), there is no reason to believe that the format would have no 
impact on the other levels on decision making, e.g. such as the Department of Defense or 
in the case of Estonia, the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The budget format and its 
11 
adequacy for decision making in the Estonian Ministry of Defense is the focus of this 
thesis. This issue is discussed further in the next paragraphs. 
Now, given that structure matters, what are the characteristics of a useful budget 
structure for making rational decisions? Anshen (1969, pp. 10-11) gives seven useful 
criteria: 
The budget design should facilitate meaningful measurement of the total 
money costs of accomplishing defined objectives. In the military budget, 
for example, this would mean a statement of the full costs of a proposed 
new missile system: research and development, investment and 
operation... 
The budget structure should facilitate the comparison of alternative ways 
to accomplish a given objective. A military example might be the 
comparison of a full time-based costs of a submarine-based missile system 
with a comparable cost display for a land-based missile... 
The budget presentation should clearly identify the future cost 
implications inherent in near-term financial commitments... 
The budget design should facilitate comparison of cost inputs and 
achievement outputs when related segments of a single program are 
administered by different management units. An example might be 
hospital services under the direction of the Veterans Administration versus 
hospital services under another jurisdiction... 
The budget design should delineate the objectives of discrete spending 
commitments in such terms that significant cost-effectiveness (cost-utility) 
analysis can be carried out. There are obvious limitations on our ability to 
define measurable goals, or even measurable progress toward such 
goals...Nevertheless, the budget design should seek continually to expand 
the area of informed analysis... 
The budget design should make it possible to aggregate related 
expenditures whenever they occur in the government's sprawling 
administrative structure... 
A budget that effectively meets the foregoing criteria should go far toward 
serving another important need - that of generating economic data on 
federal inputs to the national economy by meaningful activity segments. 
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This ends the discussion of the importance of budget structures. The remainder of 
this chapter gives an overview about the most important budgetary approaches and gives 
structural examples for most of them. 
C.        TRADITIONAL   INCREMENTAL   BUDGETING   AND   ZERO-BASED 
BUDGETING 
1.        Traditional Incremental Budgeting 
The traditional incremental budgeting does not analyze all planned expenditures 
with the same intensity. The changes from previous year's expenditures in the proposed 
budget for the next year which is usually increments, hence the name incremental 
budgeting but of course, decrements from previous years are also possible, receive the 
most attention. The expenditures that were already present in last year's budget will not 
be thoroughly analyzed. 
According to Wildawsky and Caiden (1997, pp. 45-49) the concept of a base is 
central to incremental budgeting. The base is the general expectation that programs will 
be carried out on or close to the current level of expenditures. The budget for the next 
year is thus largely determined by the budget of the last year. For that reason, it is very 
important for an agency seeking a long-term increase in its budget to achieve the 
inclusion of a new project in its base, as this will then be considered as an accepted part 
of what will be done. The authors compare the budget with an iceberg from which the 
largest part of it lies below the surface outside of anybody's control. The rationale for the 
lack of thorough annual review is that because last year's expenditures were already 
justified, recurring expenditures do not need annual review given the relative stability in 
the overall environment of the agency. This approach also assumes that the analysts, 
decision-makers and budgeters do not enough time and mental energy to analyze and 
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justify all planned expenditures every year. By leaving large portions of the budget out of 
a thorough annual analysis, incremental budgeting demands less time and energy than 
budgeting by comprehensive analysis. Another reason is the number of long-term 
commitments in the budget: mandatory programs (entitlements), such as veteran's 
pensions, cannot simply be eliminated at will. These commitments are legally binding 
and must be met regardless of circumstances. Therefore, they do not need annual 
revision. After these long-term commitments have been paid for, there is often only a 
small percentage of the budget left for anybody's discretion. 
Another linked concept is the idea of "fair share". It means not only the 
established base, but also the (common) expectation that an agency should receive a 
proportion of funds as compared to others, that must be increased or decreased over the 
base depending on circumstances. In any case history plays a big role, because it largely 
determines the base and the fair share of an agency. 
The advantage of incremental budgeting is that it simplifies calculations and 
decision-making, because only changes from the previous year must be considered and 
negotiated, thus saving considerable time and energy and decreasing conflict over 
expenditures, because the last year's share of the budget becomes the base and does not 
need thorough annual re-justification. 
The disadvantage of incremental budgeting is that past expenditures may not 
necessarily justify their continuation in the changing conditions of the future. This means 
a waste of the resources. The next budgeting approach - the ZBB - tries to address this 
problem. 
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2.        Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) 
Hyde and Shafritz (1978, pp. 218-219) note that zero-based budgeting refers to 
the budgeting process that is first and foremost a rejection of the incremental decision- 
making model of budgeting. It demands a rejustification of the entire budget submission. 
It focuses on the concept of priorities, which is more than an elaboration of alternatives. 
It reflects a concern that the governments should do things that are the most important of 
all of the things they could do. 
In other words, the ZBB states that all programs and expenditures must be 
reviewed every year, the mere fact that a program or expenditure was there last year 
provides no justification that it should be continued in the next year. Premchand (1983, 
pp. 334-335) refers to (probably) the first experiment with ZBB in the Department of 
Agriculture in 1962 that tried to fully implement the concept. The practical experience, 
however, revealed some problems. The approach required excessive paperwork and 
brought little or no change in the size or direction of the budget. As a result, the 
experience in 1962 failed. However, the ZBB was used in the federal level from 1977- 
1981. This time the concept was more elaborate. Premchand also gives the major features 
of ZBB: 
Examination of programs at various levels of resource allocation and 
performance... 
Objectives have to be formulated for each agency 
The activities of each agency are converted into decision packages, which 
are developed to show performance at various resource levels such as 
"minimum", "intermediate", "current", and "enhancement" levels, and 
The decision packages are then evaluated and arranged at each level of 
management in ranking order 
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The ranking order enables the agencies to define the minimum effort and 
indicate the incremental levels of effort above the minimum of each 
program. Those levels are then ranked in a decreasing order and a cutoff 
point is established below which the items were not funded. 
Wildawsky and Caiden (1997, p. 270) see ZBB as manifesting vertical 
comprehensiveness in contrast to horizontal comprehensiveness of PPB6: Every year 
alternative expenditure levels from base zero are considered. PPB compares programs, 
while ZBB compares alternative funding levels of the same program. 
MacManus (1998, pp. 257-260) refers to both advantages and disadvantages of 
the ZBB. The proponents like its attack on incrementalism, low-priority programs and its 
efforts to force government officials to engage in a more rational analysis of alternative 
service delivery mechanisms and levels. They also like the bottom-up rather than 
program budgeting top-down approach. 
The opponents of ZBB complain about the amount of time and resources it takes. 
They argue that the amount of paperwork needed for a single program's decision 
packages makes it improbable that all decision packages can be thoroughly analyzed and 
ranked by the policymakers. They also note that ZBB does not consider that fact that 
certain programs are very unlikely to be eliminated while others have little or no chance 
of getting funded. 
There is also a lot of discussion about whether past knowledge and history should 
be eliminated in decision-making. Wildawsky and Caiden (1997, p. 271) are quite 
skeptical about eliminating the past in ZBB. They wrote: 
6 The PPB (Planning, Programming and Budgeting) or more generally, program budgeting is discussed 
in further sections. 
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To say that a budgetary process is ahistorical is to conclude that the 
sources of error multiply while the chances of correcting mistake decrease: 
If history is abolished, nothing is ever settled. Old quarrels resurface as 
new conflicts...As mistrust grows with conflict, willingness to admit (and 
hence to correct) the error diminishes. Doing without the history is a little 
like abolishing memory - momentarily convenient, perhaps, but ultimately 
embarrassing. 
They also noted that the ZBB did not exist in its pure form in any place. When 80- 
90% of the budget becomes the base and only the rest is annually reviewed that is very 
close to incremental budgeting. An example of a zero-based budget format is given in 
Appendix A. 
The difficulties and limitations of ZBB have resulted in creating a hybrid or 
target-based-budgeting. 
3. Target-Based Budgeting (TBB) 
MacManus (1998, pp. 257-260) refers to this type of budgeting as incorporating 
the most attractive elements of the ZBB or the ranking of funding alternatives, and using 
cost-benefit estimates for different budget parameters. TBB recognizes that certain 
programs are likely to be funded in most cases and therefore do not need much annual 
scrutiny. Under TBB each organizational unit will be asked to develop two requests. The 
first is activities for the target budget (funding level pre-established by the budget office). 
The second is the others that will be funded given additional resources. All items of the 
"wish-list" are ranked in terms of priority. 
The advantage of TBB is reduced paperwork, because not all programs must be 
presented in terms of decision packages. Since the target-base can easily be shifted, this 
increases its responsiveness to changing conditions and increases the ability of program 
managers to use their judgment in resource allocation. 
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However, the flexibility of TBB can also be its disadvantage as it allows 
irresponsible managers to include their pet projects into the base to protect them from 
review. 
The incremental budgeting and ZBB are the basic budgeting approaches. The 
other budgeting types, line item budgeting, performance budgeting and program/mission 
budgeting, consider resource allocation incrementally, from base zero or use a 
combination of these two approaches. These other types of budgeting will be described in 
the following pages. 
D.        LINE-ITEM BUDGETING 
The line-item budget concentrates on objects of expenditures, i.e., the items that 
are purchased rather on the purposes for which they are bought. They are presented to the 
government as a whole and also to individual agencies and organizations. This has 
historically been the most common budget format. The most important skills with this 
type of budget were those of accountants. According to MacManus (1998, p. 253) this 
budget type is the oldest devised in the twentieth century. The examples of classes of 
expenditures include personal services, supplies, travel and utilities. These classes can 
further be broken down into sub-classes. For example personnel services can be broken 
down into salaries, wages, overtime and fringe benefits. Giving separate codes to 
individual accounts in the budget allows further classification. An example of a line-item 
budget is given in Appendix B. 
The  line-item  budget  format  and  incremental  budgeting  go  hand-in-hand. 
Although incremental budgeting does not necessarily always use the line-item format, 
when the line-item format is used as the principal budget format, its accounts are most 
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often analyzed and justified incrementally. Schick (1978, pp. 49-53) notes that the line- 
item budget is well suited for the first of the three major functions of budgeting: control. 
The control orientation deals with a relatively narrow range of objectives. Examples 
include holding agencies to established expenditure ceilings, ensuring propriety of 
expenditure, and limiting certain types of spending and purchases. This type of budget 
format was inevitable in times when personnel were unreliable. 
MacManus (1998, p. 253) refers to advantages and disadvantages of line-item 
budgets. The biggest advantage of the line-item format is its simplicity. It is easy to 
understand and use, especially when the information is presented by organizational units 
such as departments or divisions, or freestanding projects. The format promotes year-to- 
year comparisons, especially in terms of percentages. Wildawsky (1978, pp. 501, 502, 
508)8 argues that this format is the superior budget format. This is because budgeting has 
several functions. It has to contribute to continuity (for planning), to change (for policy 
evaluation), to flexibility (for the economy) and to provide rigidity (for limited spending). 
There has been much criticism against inadequate budget structures because of these 
contradictory goals, but he is convinced that just because of these multiple goals the 
traditional budgeting is inferior for most purposes, but yet superior over all. Wildawsky 
further notes that organizing the budget around activities or functions instead of purposes 
has the advantage that changing objectives would not threaten organizational survival, 
because changing objectives would not automatically mean the elimination of the 
agencies, whose sole purpose was to contribute to those objectives. Exactly because the 
7 According to him, there are three basic functions of a budget: control, management and planning. 
8 He considers the line-item budget format as traditional for incremental budgeting. Therefore his 
views about line item budgeting also apply to incremental budgeting. 
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line items are neutral in regard to policy, this budget format is compatible with a number 
of policies unlike the Planning-Programming-Budgeting (PPB) and ZBB that means it is 
more flexible and more likely to last. 
However, MacManus (1998, p. 253) points out that the problem with line item 
budgeting is that it focuses on inputs that have little connection with outputs/outcomes. 
This format makes it very difficult to reach any conclusions about effectiveness, 
efficiency9 or equity in spending and cannot hold the government accountable for how it 
operates. 
These shortcomings of the line item budgeting have caused the emergence of 
other types of budgeting, especially performance and program/mission budgeting and 
ZBB. The description of ZBB was already given above. The remaining major budgeting 
types will be described next. 
E.        PERFORMANCE BUDGETING 
1.        Classification Problems 
Before turning to this topic, a general comment is necessary. The exact conceptual 
differences between performance budgeting and program budgeting and their exact 
definitions are elusive. Several authors like Mosher (1954, p. 79), Hyde and Shafritz 
(1978, pp. 78-79) and Premchand (1983, pp. 323-325) have noticed that or have treated 
these terms as synonyms. A reader of budgetary literature should be careful to make sure 
what a particular author means while using these terms. 
9 Generally speaking, there is a difference between effectiveness - getting the most out of the resources 
by choosing the right goals for spending - and efficiency with which these chosen goals are carried out. 
However, it is advisable to make sure that different authors use these terms in this sense before making any 
firm conclusions. 
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2.        The Essence of Performance Budgeting 
Because of conceptual confusion, it is not clear when performance budgeting 
started. MacManus (1998, p. 260) mentions several options ranging from the 1910s to 
1949 when the Hoover Commission issued its report regarding the deficiencies of 
traditional control- and accounting-oriented budgeting. 
Hyde and Shafritz (1978, pp. 78-79) propose a general definition of performance 
budgeting and contrast it to program budgeting: 
Performance budgeting presents purpose and objectives for which funds 
are being allocated, examines costs of programs and activities established 
to meet these objectives, and identifies and analyses quantitative data 
measuring work performed and accomplishments...In performance 
budgeting, programs are linked to the various higher levels of an 
organization and serve as labels that encompass and structure the 
subordinate performance units...Overall the performance budgeting tends 
to be retrospective - focusing on previous accomplishments - while 
program budgeting tends to be forward looking - involving policy 
planning and forecasts. 
This definition is consistent with Schick's (1978, pp. 54-59) theory of three 
functions of budgeting: control, management and planning. According to this theory, 
performance budgeting would be most suitable for the second -management - orientation 
of the budgeting. It would facilitate the efficient performance of fixed prescribed 
activities. Its focus is on the details. In performance budgeting, the work and activities are 
treated as an ends in themselves. Unlike in program budgeting, the work and activities 
relate to the functions and work of a concrete operating unit. Therefore their classification 
is usually done along organizational lines. Thus, this classification is most useful for an 
administrator or manager who has to organize the daily operations of an organization. 
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MacManus (1998, p. 260) describes the basic steps in performance budgeting that 
could be summarized with the following: 
• Formulating goals and objectives for various activities or services 
provided be each department or organizational unit, 
• Developing performance measures that are valid indicators by which to 
gauge whether goals and objectives have been met, and 
• Linking cost and output and permitting an evaluation of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the performance and the development of management 
responses. 
The typical performance budget format incorporates elements of both line item 
and program budgeting formats. An example of a performance budgeting format is given 
in Appendix C. 
As example of how performance budgeting represents a new way of thinking, 
Mosher (1954, p. 81) provides the example of military training. Under this type of 
budgeting, funds needed for basic training would be estimated on the basis of the total 
numbers to be trained and the overall costs of training each man rather than assuming the 
training goal and adding up the salary, supply and other costs to reach that goal. Under 
this system, Congress would control the number trained, the quality of training, and the 
total cost per man rather than the number and salaries of filled positions. 
MacManus (1998, p. 260) further summarizes the advantages and disadvantages 
of performance budgeting. The proponents maintain that the inclusion of performance 
data into the budget promotes efficiency, effectiveness and accountability and thus 
improves management. 
The opponents complain that the performance objectives are often arbitrary and 
selected  only  because  "good"  data  already  exists.   Another problem  is  that  the 
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performance objectives are not comparable across organizations, thus eliminating the 
possibility of comparing their performance. A third problem is overreliance on 
quantitative indicators at the cost of quality. 
F.       PROGRAM BUDGETING AND PPBS 
1.        Classification Problems 
The problems in distinguishing program budgeting from performance budgeting 
were already mentioned under the description of performance budgeting. There are 
further problems distinguishing program budgeting from planning, programming and 
budgeting systems (PPBS or simply PPB). Lee and Johnston (1983, pp. 81-82) notice that 
PPB was used to refer to the DoD budget system developed in the 1960s, while program 
budgeting was used to refer to failed reforms of the budget systems in areas other than 
defense when the DoD system was not directly copiedio. Sometimes PPB was simply 
used to refer to a variety of budget reforms of the 1960s that were never fully 
implemented or were abandoned in the 1970s. The authors conclude that the term PPB 
has a negative connotation when referring to failures of budget reform. At the same time 
they argue that: 
The term "Program budgeting"... is used to refer to budget systems that, 
like PPB, link data about the results of governmental activities with their 
cost but that avoid some of the cumbersome processes that were part of 
the PPB systems. Today most people tend to use "PPB" in an historical 
context and use "program budgeting" as a more general term; PPB can be 
thought of as one version of program budgeting. 
10 DoD still uses its PPBS, while it was abandoned in most other spheres of government. Jones and 
Bixler (1992, p. 20) offer several explanations for that outcome: the PPBS may have succeeded in DoD 
because it was specifically developed for defense, where many program and budget decisions were made 
on the basis of assessing alternatives and where quantitative data were available and amenable to the cost- 
effectiveness analysis and other analytical methodologies. Alternatively, they suggest that the PPBS 
survived because it was too costly to change to another system or because of reasons related to political 
competition between the OSD and the service branches. 
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However, because the two systems use essentially the same concepts of 
structuring the budget systems, they tend to use these terms interchangeablyn. Leaving 
these terminological problems aside, the next pages give the description of program 
budgeting in general and then turn to more specific DoD PPB systems. 
2. Program Budgeting 
It seems that the essence of program budgeting can best be explained by 
contrasting it with the other types of budgeting. Using Schick's (1978) classification 
mentioned above, the program budgeting assumes the primacy of the third function a 
budget can have or the planning function. In the context of budgeting, planning means the 
determination of objectives, the evaluating of alternative courses of action and the 
authorization of selected programs. A planning orientation focuses on the broadest range 
of issues. These are governmental policies and their link to particular expenditure 
choices, how programs should be assessed and the criteria on the basis of which they 
should be created or terminated. Unlike in performance budgeting where the objective is 
fixed, the objective itself is a variable in program budgeting. The analysis of existing 
programs may lead to a statement of new objectives and a termination of old ones. 
Program budgeting focuses on expenditure aggregates, the details matter only when they 
contribute to the analysis of the total. Whereas performance budgeting used the tools of 
scientific management and cost accounting, program budgeting uses techniques from 
systems analysis and economics. In performance budgeting, the focus is on fulfilling the 
given objectives at least cost. In program budgeting, the focus is on allocating resources 
11 This will also be the approach in later chapters of this thesis. 
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among competing claims and the budget is considered as a policy statement^. Because 
program budgeting focuses on the end products or the missions and purposes of the 
government, its budget programs often cut across the organizational lines, because a 
single organization may contribute to several missions of the government. This type of 
information is not very useful to managers who are responsible for managing their 
particular organizations, but rather to top-level decision-makers who must make 
decisions covering the whole spectrum of organizations and allocate resources among 
competing claims from different organizations. Another difference between those two 
types of budgeting is that the performance budget is concerned with the process of work 
(how should it be done), while the program budgeting deals with the purpose of work 
(what should be done). 
Lee and Johnston (1983, pp. 93-94) note that program budgeting in defense is 
based upon the limited rationality model described at the beginning of the chapter. They 
also note that contrary to many misconceptions, program budgeting does not make 
decisions. It only supplies information to decision-makers. 
Schick (1978) gives also the differences between program budgeting and 
traditional budgeting. In traditional budgeting the existing base and the incremental 
changes from it have a central position. In contrast, program budgeting determines a 
broad goal and tries to find a way to achieve it, whereas the path is not incrementali3. 
12 Novick (1973, p. vii) offers yet another distinction between performance budgeting and program 
budgeting. He states that the philosophy of program budgeting is that more resources are wasted doing the 
wrong things efficiently than can ever be wasted doing the right things inefficiently. For him, performance 
budgeting and MBO (Management by Objectives, a related concept) were concerned with efficiency; the 
program budgeting was a "decision making system" aiming at "big choices". 
13 The issue is not so clear in all cases, however. For example, MacManus (1998, p. 257) refers to 
program budgeting as facilitating incrementalism, as funds may be allocated incrementally among different 
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Another distinction is that traditional budgeting is relatively decentralized and done in a 
bottom-up mode. In contrast, the program budgeting tends to lead to centralized top- 
down policy making. 
Wildawsky and Caiden (1997, p. 270) give the distinction between program 
budgeting and ZBB. While ZBB promotes vertical comprehensiveness, the same 
programs are analyzed at different funding levels. Program budgeting promotes 
horizontal comprehensiveness when comparing different programs. 
MacManus (1998, p. 253) gives a description of establishing a program budget 
format. This includes: a) determining a broad goal or objective and labeling it as a 
program; b) breaking the program down into subprogram elements and activities 
(outcomes), c) reporting staffing and funding levels for each program, subprogram and 
activity. This topic will be observed in greater depth in later parts of the chapter. In 
general, program budgets like line item budgets tend to favor incremental budgeting. An 
example of a program budget format is given in Appendix D. 
There is a considerable amount of discussion concerning the advantages and 
disadvantages of program budgeting. MacManus (1998, p. 260) refers to both schools. 
She notes that the proponents of program budgeting stress its emphasis on long-term 
planning and efficiency (the best way to achieve the desired outcomes). 
The critics complain about the somewhat arbitrary assignment of expenditures to 
various programs and about the difficulty of tracking those expenditures without a 
crosswalk (a document specifying the codes of accounts that are included to a particular 
programs almost as easily as among different line items. 
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program). This leads Wildawsky (1969, pp. 189-202) to conclude that no one knows how 
to do program budgeting because it is impossible to state it in operational terms. Another 
problem is that because the structure of a program budget tends to change when the 
objectives change, it is difficult to make long-term comparisons of budgets. A third 
problem is that genuine cost-benefit analysis is often impossible because of the lack of 
data, time and agreement on how to measure costs and benefits. 
One of the most prominent critics of program budgeting, Wildawsky (1978, pp. 
501-509), mentions a fourth problem with program budgeting. He argues that although 
the PPB budget structure facilitates the recognition of errors in the budget, the budget 
structure makes it hard to correct it. This is because a program budget has many 
interrelated elements and a change in one element will cause changes in many other 
elements as well, and doing these corrections is time-consuming. He concludes that in 
program budgeting there are essentially only two options for correcting errors: revolution 
or resignation, which are not very useful in most cases. 
Mosher (1954, p. 81) also notes that program budgeting is extremely difficult 
budgeting, because it does not eliminate previous work with line-item budgets, but is an 
addition to that. Although he did not mean this as a critique, this is an issue that must be 
taken into account as this surely increases the costs of implementing program budgets. 
In the next paragraphs, attention is turned to the best-known example of program 
budgeting, the PPBS. 
3. Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) 
In very general terms, the PPBS begins with determining national interests and 
threats to those interests. A strategy is then developed to encounter the threats and defend 
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the interests. Then the programs are developed to fulfill the broad goals or missions of the 
strategy. The programs are structured in a manner that facilitates resource allocation 
between and within them. The budget is just the expression of the programs in financial 
terms as used by the legislature. Programming is thus the link that unites plans with 
budgets. Contrary to misconceptions, the goal of the PPBS is not to make decisions, but 
just packaging information for top-level decision-makers in the manner that they could 
make informed decisions. 
Similarly, Kaufmann (1964, p. 173) notes that PPB is the device for centralized 
planning through which the national security objectives are related to strategy, strategy to 
forces, forces to resources and resources to costs. 
Premchand (1983, pp. 325-326) and others note that PPB or program budgeting 
was first established in the U.S. Department of Defense. Then it had three principal 
features: 
A system of classification in which programs were related to a major 
objective of policy, were capable of being classified into a number of 
elements that could be substituted for each other and that lent themselves 
to a preferred mix, and that cut across service lines and allowed 
coordination among them. 
A program analysis allowing effective and efficient ways for reaching the 
goal 14 
An annual budget cycle in which classification and program analysis 
became integral parts. The DoD system was later extended throughout the 
U.S. Federal Government in 1965, but was terminated again in the 1970s. 
DoD still continues to use PPBS. 
14 In general, effectiveness means getting most out of the given resources, while the objective itself is 
variable. The efficiency means achieving a given goal for least cost. However it is always good to check 
the meaning in different books as different authors may use these words in a different sense. 
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Hyde and Shafritz (1978, pp. 120-121) and others note that PPBS began by 
claiming that it could interrelate and coordinate planning, programming and budgeting. 
Planning would be related to programs that would be keyed to budgeting. The PPBS 
pushed the time horizon out to half a decade, requiring five-year forecasts for program 
plans and cost estimates. PPBS placed a new emphasis on program objectives, outputs 
and cost estimates. The authors also refer to R. McNamara who was one of the major 
proponents of PPB S: 
When he was nominated Secretary of Defense, he did not like what he saw 
in DoD. The plans were formulated without considering costs, alternatives 
were not considered and each of the services submitted their own budget 
with their own priorities. Therefore he was interested in having a planning 
and program budget that would allow him to make budgetary decisions of 
real consequence. 
Hitch (1996, p. 258), one of the "founding fathers" of PPBS describes the system 
as comprising two main components: 
Programming - to provide a link between military planning and annual 
budgeting; 
Systems analysis (or cost-effectiveness analysis) - to assist in making 
some of the hard choices on what goes into the program. 
These aspects will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
Jones and Bixler (1992, p. 20), referring to an article of L. Korb note that 
although the manner in which the system operates has varied, the basic characteristics 
have remained the same. The three stages of PPBS will be described next. The 
description relies on Jones and Bixler (1992, pp. 19-31). 
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a.        Planning 
The planning phase begins with determining the goals and missions of 
DoD. The policy direction comes not only within the PPBS framework, but also from the 
President, State Department and other executive branch agencies as well as Congress. 
The international commitments and treaties may also influence the determination of goals 
and missions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSD and the services then separately define 
assessments of threats and resource estimates to meet the threats and commitments with 
acceptable risk levels. These independent evaluations are then combined by the OSD to 
produce the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The document annually indicates the 
assets, forces and other resources needed to satisfy the national security objectives. It 
covers threats and opportunities, policy, strategy, force planning, resource planning and 
fiscal guidance, and includes a summary of major policy issues. This document provides 
the basis for service-branch and OSD programming and budgeting. 
Policy and resource planning is accomplished within the framework of the 
PPBS program structure. This comprises 11 programs: support of other nations, strategic 
forces, general purpose forces, intelligence and communications, airlift and sealift, guard 
and reserve forces, R&D, central supply and maintenance, training and personnel, 
administration and special operation forces. The programs are crosswalked to the 
appropriation format used by the Congress or to some other formats, for example, used 
by services and commands. The policy and programmatic planning take a long-term 
perspective of 10-20 years and beyond, while programming and budgeting take a six-year 
perspective. However in practice the programming and budgeting focus on a two-year 
period and much of the budget is decided upon annually, although the six-year 
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projections are prepared for programming and budgeting. Planning within PPBS is only 
marginally resource constrained. It articulates the amount of resources needed to 
minimize the threat independent of resource constraints so that the choices among 
alternative force structures and threat responses may be made knowledgeably during the 
programming and budgeting phases. 
b.        Programming 
This phase is guided by the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) which 
aggregates and translates the program elements (PEs) that are the basic building blocks 
on projected asset requirements into the force programming framework of PPBS. It 
comprises six years and provides a summary of requirements and alternatives for 
achieving force structure, readiness, sustainability and modernization objectives. 
The task of programming is to articulate and prioritize a six-year defense 
resource demand into the perspective of a moving two-year cycle. Programming is 
intended to integrate the capabilities of all the individual components of each service 
branch into coherent packages. While programming by the military departments is a 
complex process that differs between service branches, it generally comprises three 
phases: program planning and appraisal, program development, and program decision 
and appeals. Programming is considerably more cost-constrained than planning but still 
places the greatest emphasis on the technical capability relative to peacekeeping and war- 
fighting demands. 
c        Budgeting 
This phase is primarily an effort to allocate resources across and within the 
military  departments  according  to  planning  and  programming  decisions.  Budget 
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formulation requires the issuance of preparation guidelines, the collection of 
programmatic and cost data, the provision for opportunities to program justification into 
hearings, the analysis of proposals for adherence to both financial and policy guidelines, 
and the negotiation of program priorities within the constraints of the budget authority 
projected to be available in the next two fiscal years and four out-years under the biennial 
budget process. It also attempts to respond to short-term contingencies resulting from 
changes in the international environment and the new policy initiatives flowing from 
Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Defense. 
Budgeting is a highly constrained exercise in pricing the executability of 
programs within the parameters of affordability and political feasibility. Coordination and 
reconciliation of the multitudinous budgetary perspectives of the military departments, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, and is the task of the OSD staff. 
The defense plan and budget are prepared by the OSD, the military 
departments, and uniformed services on a programmatic basis with requests to Congress 
divided into the 11 programs noted previously. This program structure is crosswalked 
into appropriations, functions, subfunctions, object-of-expenditures, and other budget 
formats by DoD for presentation to a review by Congress. Although DoD prepares the 
program budget, Congress does not review or enact the budget on the DoD programmatic 
base. Instead, the six major committees employ separate authorization and appropriation 
processes for policy, program, and budget decision-making. Congress reviews, 
negotiates, and executes much of DoD's budget proposal on a project and object-of- 
expenditure basis. 
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Due to the importance of programming for rational decision making, the structural 
and analytical aspects of programming will be discussed in greater depth in the next 
chapter. There is one more type of budgeting that should be mentioned which is mission 
budgeting. It will be described in the following section. 
G.       MISSIONS AND MISSION BUDGETING 
There is considerably confusion about what a mission is. The DoD defines a 
mission as: 
The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be 
taken and the reason therefor 15 
The NATO definition is similar: 
A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose 16. 
However these definitions are so general that they allow a wide range of 
interpretations. In general usage, a mission could thus be synonymous with task, 
objective or purpose. Both the military forces and the civilian sector of the government 
have missions. The military strategy gives major missions to the forces. However, these 
missions are general in nature. There could also be other, more detailed missions. The 
broad missions can be taken from the strategy, but at the same time, even the smallest 
military unit must have a clear purpose, a mission or missions. 
Similarly to many other types of budgeting and budgets, the term mission 
budgeting can have different meanings. In a general sense, program budgeting could also 
be described as mission budgeting as long as it focuses on the missions and purposes of 
the government, and develops different programs for different missions. However, a 
15 Joint Pub 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994. 
16 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 7 August 2000 (AAP-6 (V)). 
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number of people argue that although this is what program budgeting is supposed to be, 
this is not case in reality. For example, several of the 11 programs the DoD currently uses 
in its PPBS cannot be the purpose or end-missions of defense, but rather a means or way 
to achieve those missions. Wildawsky (1978, p. 184) argues that only two of the nine 
DoD program categories are genuine programs in the sense of pointing to end purposes or 
objectives^. In particular, he refers to strategic retaliation and continental defense, which 
he considers together and the program of general purpose forces that is meant for a 
limited war anywhere in the world. He argues that the other programs only support these 
two missions: airlift and sealift support, general purpose forces and R&D and reserve 
forces are supposed to support other defense objectives. Davis (1999) is also critical 
about the way the current programs are structured and argues that using the same 
programs today would suggest that there has not been a significant change in the strategic 
environment for 37 years, which ignores the reality of the post-Cold War environment. 
Additionally, he argues that the five-year defense program has merely become an 
accounting tool that plays no role in making real decisions 18. 
Going further, Wildawsky and Caiden (1997, p. 222) refer to several studies that 
stress the necessity of having organization framework procedures that support budgeting 
for missions and argue that DoD itself is not structured along combat mission lines. Jones 
17 The general number of DoD programs has apparently changed over time, as in the 1990s there were 
11 programs. 
18 He proposes to structure the major force programs around the following issues: shaping the 
international environment through presence and engagement around the globe, responding to regional 
crises and preparing for the demands of an uncertain future by pursuing a modernization program that 
captures the tenets of the revolution in military affairs and new operational concepts. 
His critique is the more relevant, because he was an insider. He retired as the Army Chief of Staffs 
chief of program development in 1997. However, his critique does not reject the programming concept as 
such, but the lack of its update. If the programs are not structured along relevant missions, then the 
programming cannot fulfill its promises. 
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and Bixler (1992, chap. 9), Thompson and Jones (1994) and Thompson (1991) represent 
the same argument by submitting several reform proposals, which they call mission 
budgeting. The proposals are comprehensive and affect not only the current budgeting 
procedures and classifications, but require a far-reaching reform of the whole Defense 
Department. They will be described next. 
Their central idea about organizational structure is comprised of two rules. First, 
strategy should determine the structure. Single mission organizations should be organized 
along functional lines; while multimission organizations should be organized along 
mission lines; and multimission, multifunction organizations should be organized along 
matrix linesi9. The second rule is decentralization whenever possible. It means prior 
classification of the purpose or function of each administrative unit and responsibility 
center, procedures for setting objectives and for monitoring and rewarding performance 
and a control structure that links each responsibility center to the goals of the 
organization as a whole. Jones and Bixler define decentralization as the usage of ex post 
controls (as opposed to ex ante controls of centralization), but it does not include 
eliminating central policy direction from the top, hierarchically established goals and 
centralized control procedures that are part of any well-managed organization. 
19 The definitions are taken from Thompson (1991, pp. 52-53): 
Strategy - pattern of purposes and policies that defines the organization and its missions and that 
positions it relative to its environment 
Functions of top management in any organizations: planning, organizing, staffing and development 
Structure- this may mean three different things: 
1. Administrative structure - division of labor (seen in organization charts) 
2. Responsibility structure - distribution of individual authority and responsibility within the 
organization. Jones and Bixler (1992, p. 209) define responsibility structure of DoD as those elements of 
the organization that carry out the primary mission of defending U.S. national security interests - the 
military commands 
3. Account or control structure - system of measuring and evaluating performance. 
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The authors believe that the failure to think these structural relationships through 
produces a centralized organization that is rife with externalities in which everything 
depends upon everything else, i.e. decentralization is impossible there. They further 
maintain that this has happened in DoD, where management control, budgeting, and 
accounting structures do not correspond well either to its mission and responsibility 
structure or the organization structure as a whole and DoD has failed to clarify 
administrative boundaries, roles, mission responsibilities and to delegate authority 
accordingly. As a result they believe the current DoD organization is too centralized, 
bureaucratic and cumbersome, because whenever structural problems occurred, they were 
hoped to be solved by creating a new process, mechanism or unit on top of the old 
organization. Instead of supporting the responsibility or mission structure, the control 
structure appears to dominate in DoD. 
To improve this situation, Thompson (1991) and Thompson and Jones (1994, 
chap. 8) propose to distinguish between mission20 centers and support centers. A mission 
center, the US combatant command according to the contemporary military strategy, 
contributes directly to the organization's objectives whereas the task of support centers or 
uniformed services, is only to support mission center(s) in accomplishing their objectives 
by supplying combat and support units to the combatant commands. The costs of support 
centers should be charged to the mission center(s) they support. The DoD organizational 
structure should become a matrix, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the top, the combatant 
20 They found 10 missions: strategic nuclear retaliation, theater nuclear retaliation, conventional 
defense of a number of geographic areas throughout the world (central Europe, northern Europe, Greece 
and Turkey, the Persian Gulf states, the Republic of Korea, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and continental 
U.S. plus Hawaii, Alaska, Panama, the Atlantic and the Caribbean) and intelligence and communications 
(p. 55). 
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commands or mission centers the rows, and the uniformed services or support centers the 
columns. The proposed new management control structure of DoD is given in Appendix 
E. 
Under their vision, the budget guidance should be issued to the combatant 
commands, which are allowed to "buy" forces from the uniformed services. This quasi- 
commercialization should be kept only in peacetime, of course. Congress should issue 
budget authority directly to combatant commands rather than to the military services. The 
combatant commands would still need Congressional approval to make substantial 
changes in operations, activities, equipment and the undertaking major investments, but 
Congress should stop micromanaging line-items, although the line-items themselves 
would not disappear from the budget. A new feature would be giving permanent budget 
authority to commands in terms of discounted net cash flows. The accounting practices 
would also need reforming to bring the accounts in line with missions. In particular, they 
propose accrual accounting as essential for this type of budgeting by measuring the costs 
of items consumed, not of the items purchased, of course the reporting should be 
improved and changed to show the performance of mission centers, whereas the volume 
of reports should not increase. 
Jones and Bixler (1992, chap. 9) propose an even more revolutionary version of 
this reform. The responsibility for operations and procurement would be placed at the 
command level. The military commands would not only be allowed to "buy" units from 
uniformed services as in the previous proposal, but they would also have the authority to 
make direct contracts with the private sector to procure military capital assets and sustain 
their operations in general. Under this system the financial role of policymakers would be 
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specifying in lump-sum terms how much should be spent for each national security 
objective by command and mission area rather than by separate appropriations to separate 
military departments. Their basic assumption is that the military commanders know best 
what they need for fulfilling the missions and their military judgment should be used. Of 
course, the commanders would still need guidance from both Congress and DoD, but 
they should be free to use resources in a manner that they think is appropriate. They do 
need to report back on their activities, but the reporting will concentrate on the extent to 
which the objectives were accomplished and not how they were met. The laws to prohibit 
fraud would remain unchanged, however. 
It is not known what the mission budget proposed by Jones and Bixler (1992) and 
others would look like, as the authors did not focus on the budget format, but rather on 
the management control and financing in general. Their proposals have not been 
implemented so far, so there is no empirical evidence about mission budget formats. 
However, it is plausible to assume that if the organizational structure comes from the 
strategy, the general appearance of the mission budget structure could also resemble the 
matrix structure given in Appendix E. 
H.       CONCLUSION 
To summarize, there are budgetary approaches that aim for incremental budgeting 
and approaches that aim for a more rational approach to budgeting, although an actual 
budget system may simultaneously use elements from different budget systems. The 
incremental line item budgeting does not support rationality because of the lack of 
comprehensive analysis and some other reasons. The other budgeting approaches such as 
the ZBB, performance budgeting and program budgeting aim towards more rational 
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decision making to a varying degree. The problem with performance budgeting and ZBB 
are that they generally neglect the longer than annual time frame needed for rational 
decisions. From the point of view of ministerial and high level military decision makers, 
performance budgeting puts too much stress on efficiency in particular administrative 
units rather than on "big choices". Therefore, performance budgeting is not the rational 
approach at the Estonian MoD level, although it may be useful at lower levels in the 
chain of command for national defense. In this way, it seems that the mission-oriented 
program budgeting is the most suitable for rational decision making and planning in the 
Ministry of Defense and high-level military staffs, because it is specifically designed for 
top-level planning and decision making. Therefore, the structural and analytical aspects 
of PPBS programming, the true program budget, will be discussed in greater detail in the 
next chapter. 
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III.    TRANSLATING DEFENSE PLANS INTO BUDGETS: 
STRUCTURAL AND ANALYTICAL ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY 
PROGRAM BUDGET 
A.       THE CONCEPT OF PROGRAMMING 
Hitch and McKean (1961, pp. 46-64) gave the basic philosophy behind a defense 
program budget. First they noted that there were two possible approaches for defense: 
budget first and need first. The budget-firsters believe that the size of the defense budget 
should be determined in the light of cost alone. The need-firsters believe that programs 
should be determined in the light of the needs alone. Hitch and McKean rejected both 
approaches and argued that: 
The truth is, however, that one cannot properly draw up defense plans on 
the basis of either cost alone or needs alone. There is no budget size or 
cost that is correct regardless of the payoff, and there is no need that 
should be met regardless of cost. 
Therefore they stressed the importance of getting the most out of the resources, 
not hunting for a right budget, requirement, or doctrine. As a result they regarded the 
questions "What can we afford for defense?" and "What are our needs?" as meaningless 
and argued that instead the right question to ask is: "How much is needed for defense 
more than is needed for other purposes?" Although the authors did not explicitly mention 
that, they used the same approach also for resource allocation between different defense 
missions, not just for allocating resources between defense and nondefense. For example, 
the right question within defense could be something like: How much is needed for 
carrying out a particular mission more than it is needed for other missions? To get an 
answer to the last question they proposed to think in terms of programs: a combination of 
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activities that produce distinguishable products, in particular programs that perform tasks 
and yield end products, rather than actions that yield objects or intermediate products. 
However, they noted that distinguishing between programs and objects is often not 
unambiguous and the level of aggregation of objects must be properly chosen. For 
example, they believed that allocating every military item and activity to national security 
programs would not be very meaningful. At the same time, they did not think that 
assessing the adequacy of the defense budget could be achieved by thinking about the 
gains from categories like paper clips or personnel. Therefore, they proposed to develop 
programs that would aggregate activities that produce certain end products such as 
capabilities for nuclear retaliation or limited war. For these kinds of categories, it is 
possible to make judgments about their worth and also their cost. Hitch and McKean also 
stressed the need for costing out the programs for several years ahead. Another crucial 
aspect for getting the most out of resources was the idea of presenting alternatives, both 
different funding levels for the same program and for different programs, for decision 
making. This was important because in this way additional costs for developing an 
additional military capability could be compared and this would facilitate informed 
decisions. They recommended using a force structure as the basis for the program 
structure, but they also stressed that a particular force structure should not be considered 
only in terms of costs and absolute military capabilities. The relative strength as 
compared to potential enemy forces could be another important factor. Although the 
planned force structure should form the basis for programs, the stress should not be on 
any particular force structure, but on developing alternative ways for carrying out the 
broad missions. Regarding the choices of programs, they noted that the jointly used 
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items, such as administration, could be considered as separate aggregate and joint costs 
could be allocated among programs according to crude rules of thumb. 
It must be stressed that the classification of costs into meaningful programs is not 
the main goal of the programming. Instead, the goal is to structure information in the way 
that would facilitate analysis of alternative ways of achieving the military mission, 
calculate costs and on the basis of the above, to consider both costs and effectiveness of 
alternatives in making a decision. After finishing the program packaging, Hitch and 
McKean (1961, p. 58) recommended that the Administration and the Congress choose 
among explicit, meaningful programs in deciding on the size of the defense budget. The 
multiple program levels2i would then be advisable to the current blind additions or cuts 
from the budget and programs. This ends the description of the programming concept. 
The next section shows how the programming was carried out in practice. 
B.        PROGRAMMING AND ANALYSIS IN ACTION 
The   concept   of programming   that   was   described   above  was   essentially 
implemented in the DoD PPBS system. Hitch (1996, p. 259) gives his actual experience 
with PPBS in the 1960s. He notes that before establishing PPBS each year, the Joint 
Chiefs produced a massive intermediate range plan and sent it to the Secretary of 
Defense. However, because this plan was financially unfeasible, the Secretary filed it 
after receiving it and that plan played almost no role in actual resource allocations during 
annual budgetary decisions. To improve the situation, DoD developed a five-year 
program budget, then called the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program or 
21 This is a good example that Hitch and McKean (1961) did not exclude using ZBB elements together 
with program budgeting. 
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FYFSP, that provided the link between planning and budgeting. Hitch gives the most 
important aspects of this program budget as follows: 
Its basic structural elements were those used by the military planners - 
army divisions, air force squadrons, naval ships, weapon systems etc. 
Each element was fully costed out over a five year period - including all 
costs, capital and operating, regardless of budget category (we did not 
abandon the old budget structure - Congress preferred its familiar 
categories - but developed a converter to translate budget into programs 
and vice versa22. 
The forces and weapons included in the FYFSP were not wish lists, but 
programs, which had been received and approved by the Secretary within 
fiscal constraints, which the Secretary considered feasible and reasonable. 
We were trying with some success to get the military planners to make 
hard choices instead of dreaming. 
All elements of DoD were included, support and overhead as well as line, 
so that the total costs of all program elements constituted the required 
budget. Next year's fiscal budget became the first annual slice of the Five- 
Year Program budget. 
To decide which program elements should go into the program, DoD applied a 
systems analysis by looking broadly at the costs and benefits of alternative plans, both 
measurable and nonmeasurable. According to Massey (1963, p. 32) the most important 
aspect of effectiveness measurement, for example benefits, is the requirement that it be 
traced back to basic national security objectives. Whether a weapon system has superior 
performance or enormous destruction capability is important only in this context. The test 
is how it scores on both a cost and effectiveness basis of comparison with alternative 
22 The fact that Congress does not appropriate money on a programmatic basis is a serious problem for 
program budgeting. For example, Shehane (1994) demonstrates a potential problem vividly by noting that 
Congress may approve manpower in one appropriation and operations in another, and then deny the 
funding for equipment. As a result, the program manager has to implement an incomplete program. 
However, this limitation does not totally undermine the rationale for using a program budget internally, 
because if not used the military may have incomplete programs not only because Congress denies funding 
for some items, but because nobody has considered the total resource requirement for all programs in a 
given time-frame. 
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ways of performing the same task. From the beginning, not all major programs or 
program packages were organized around major military missions. Some programs were 
organized around a set of related purposes. Only the first four major programs: Strategic 
Retaliatory Forces, Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces, General Purpose Forces 
and Airlift and Sealift23, contributed directly to national security objectives. The other 
major programs just supported the first four mission - oriented packages or are categories 
that could not be charged meaningfully against the other packages. 
Novick (1969, pp. 87-99) adds that the program budget procedure has two goals. 
First, to permit analysis of total force structures for all the services in terms of common 
missions or national objectives and second, to protect the resource impact (future needs) 
of the proposed force structures over an extended period of years to ensure adequate 
funding in the future. To achieve the first goal, a program element like the Navy's Polaris 
missile system was identified as an element of a program (Strategic Retaliatory Forces) 
that had to compete for funding together with other elements of the same program, such 
as the Minuteman or Titan24. To achieve the second goal, all development, procurement 
and operating expenses were identified over the expected life, or administratively 
specified period, of the system. He further notes that the five-year plan was a unified 
DoD plan rather than an aggregation of separate service plans. Another feature of the 
23 Smithies (1969, pp. 43-45) generally agrees with this classification, but he does not put Airlift and 
Sealift to the primary, but to supporting programs, because it supports the General Purpose Forces. He 
considers Airlift and Sealift as a separate program only because within its framework, airlift and sealift 
capabilities could compete with each other for achieving national security objectives. This shows again that 
there may not be an ideal program structure, as different people do not even agree on what the established 
program structure represents. 
24 In his terminology, the inclusion of an item to a program would not yet necessarily guarantee 
funding. He distinguishes between the program structure that should facilitate analysis and a separate five- 
year force structure and financial program that then includes only approved program elements and funding. 
This illustrates one more time that the program budgeting terminology is not always standardized. 
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five-year plan was that was updated monthly rather than once a year25. To ensure that the 
most current information is in the plan, DoD developed a program proposal system that 
allowed the services to request changes to an existing program. Usually changes were 
made as a result of a major study about costs and effectiveness26 of a particular program 
element. 
Novick (1969, pp. 92-93) also gives an illustration of the major programs as they 
were used in the 1960s. They are given here in full detail: 
Program I 
Strategic Retaliatory Forces: the forces that are designed to carry out the 
long-range strategic mission and to carry the main burden of battle in 
general. They include the long-range bombers, the air-to-ground and 
decoy missiles, and the refueling tankers; the land-based and submarine- 
based strategic missiles; and the systems for their command and control 
Program II 
Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces: those weapon systems, 
warning and communication networks and ancillary equipment required to 
detect, identify, track, and destroy unfriendly forces approaching the 
North-American continent 
Program III 
General Purpose Forces: the forces relied upon to perform the entire 
range of combat operations short of general nuclear war. These include 
most of the Army's combat and combat support units, virtually all Navy 
units, all Marine Corps units, and the tactical units of the Air Force 
Program IV 
25 This changed later as Jones and Bixler (1992, p. 23) note that the Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP, the new name for the FYFSP) is updated three times a year. 
26 The effectiveness in his usage could be measured as the extent to which program element fulfilled 
the national security objectives. An example of effectiveness criteria could be population and floor space 
destroyed, expected number of targets destroyed (for strategic retaliatory forces) and tons of ordnance 
delivered, number of sorties, expected number of targets destroyed (for tactical attack air forces). 
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Airlift and Sealift Forces: those airlift and sealift forces required to move 
troops and cargo promptly to wherever they might be needed. Included in 
the airlift forces are both the MATS transports and the Air Force Tactical 
Air Command troop carrier aircraft. The sealift forces include the troop 
ships, cargo ships, and tankers operated by MSTS and the "Forward 
Floating Bases" 
Program V 
Reserve and National Guard Forces: equipment, training, and 
administration of the Reserve and National Guard personnel of the several 
services 
Program VI 
Research and Development: all research and development effort not 
directly identified with elements of other programs (i.e. where there has 
been no decision to produce for inventory) 
Program VII 
General Support: support activities of the several services and the 
agencies that serve the entire Department of Defense. It constitutes an "all- 
other" or residual category of activities or programs and includes all costs 
not capable of being directly or meaningfully allocated to the other major 
programs 
Program VIII 
Military Assistance: equipment, training, and related services provided for 
armed forces and friendly nations 
Program IX 
Civil Defense: federal assistance for fallout shelters, warning and 
radiological monitoring systems, training and education for emergency 
preparedness etc. 
As an example of even more detailed classification, Novick (1969, p. 93) gives 




B/EB-47; RB-47; B-52; AGM-28A/B; GAM-87; B-58; KC-97; KC-135; 
RC-135. 
Missile Forces, Land Based 
Atlas; Titan; Minuteman 
Missile Forces, Sea Based 
Polaris System; Regulus System 
Command Control, Communications and Support 
SAC Control System (465L); PACCS (KC-135/B-47); UHF Emergency 
Rocket Communication System; Base Operating Support; Advanced 
Flying and Missile Training; Headquarters and Command Support. 
C.       A CHALLENGE FOR PRACTICAL PROGRAMMING 
There is a challenge a programmer has to overcome. Since all programs should 
equal the total defense budget, every resource and cost can be counted only once, 
although an equipment or unit may be used for different purposes. In other words, all 
programs must be collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive28. Mosher (1954, pp. 
94-95) gives an illustration of this general problem. If, for example, medical care is 
classified as a primary purpose or program of the Navy Department, then all other 
programs that use medical services would be incomplete. The same problem arises when 
training is established as a separate program, but most of the funds are allocated under 
other "programs" like personnel, forces and facilities. This means that if the programs are 
structured along the administrative functional lines like personnel, training, construction, 
27 Of course, the acronyms do not just mean numbers of aircraft like B-52, but the entire military units 
like B-52 squadrons or forces necessary to make these aircraft operational. 
28 Of course, the same applies to budgeting in general. The sum of all budget accounts must be equal 
with the total budget, not more or less. However, because the traditional budget is organized around the 
inputs, many of the output-oriented classification problems do not arise. 
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or medical care, then developing an effective program structure that would be focused on 
the end products is often not possible at the same time. However, structuring programs 
along functional lines would greatly facilitate their administration, because each existing 
department of an agency would be responsible for "their" program. There is no "good" 
solution to that problem, if, for example, the same equipment and not just the same type, 
is used for two different programs, its costs must be either put to one program with the 
understanding that another program is undercharged or its costs must be allocated among 
those programs that benefit from its use. 
The last part of the chapter discusses how well the programming or program 
budget satisfies the criteria for rational decision making given at the beginning of the 
Chapter II. 
D.       PROGRAMMING AND RATIONAL DECISION MAKING 
Although the PPBS programming is far from being ideal for rational decision 
making, it facilitates better budgeting and decisions at the top levels of management than 
was possible under traditional budgeting. The programming satisfies most of the criteria 
for rational decision making that were given in Chapter II. They are investigated now in 
more detail in the next paragraphs. These criteria specified by Anshen (1969, pp. 10-11) 
are given one more time in the text and the assessment follows. 
• The budget design should facilitate meaningful measurement of the total 
money costs of accomplishing defined objectives. In the military budget, 
for example, this would mean a statement of the full costs of a proposed 
new missile system: research and development, investment and operation. 
Assessment: although the program budget does not necessarily allow 
assessing the total money costs in case they are incurred in the future after 
five years, taking the five-year time span into consideration is a big 
improvement as compared with annual budgets. 
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The budget structure should facilitate the comparison of alternative ways 
to accomplish a given objective. 
Assessment: this is possible in the program structure of a military program 
budget, because competing program elements are identified in each major 
force program and only the elements with the best cost-effectiveness ratios 
are chosen. 
The budget presentation should clearly identify the future cost 
implications inherent in near-term financial commitments. 
Assessment: the military program budget satisfies this requirement, 
because all programs must be costed at least five years into the future as 
compared with annual budgeting. 
The budget design should facilitate comparison of cost inputs and 
achievement outputs when related segments of a single program are 
administered by different management units. 
Assessment: The first part of this criterion is satisfied, because focusing on 
the outputs of the resource spending is one of the principal features of 
programming. Because the military units can be grouped together into a 
program regardless' of their subordination the second part of the criterion 
is also satisfied. 
The budget design should delineate the objectives of discrete spending 
commitments in such terms that significant cost-effectiveness (cost-utility) 
analysis can be carried out. 
Assessment: the analysis has a central role in military program budgeting. 
The extent to which a genuine cost-effectiveness analysis can be carried 
out depends on the concrete information packaging details and the ability 
of the decision makers to agree on how to measure and what is counted as 
costs and benefits. But generally, the facilitation of cost-effectiveness (or 
cost-benefits29) analysis is one of the most important functions of 
programming. 
The budget design should make it possible to aggregate related 
expenditures whenever they occur in the government's sprawling 
administrative structure. 
Assessment: this is possible to the extent allowed by the classification 
details. Limitations may arise similar to the challenge mentioned with 
medical care and training in the previous section. Therefore the extent to 
which it is possible depends on the nature of these related expenditures. 
29 Generally speaking, the difference between cost-effectiveness and cost-benefits analysis lies in the 
measurement of the spending results. The cost-effectiveness analysis measures the results (effectiveness) of 
spending the resources (costs) in quantitative (usually) or qualitative (less commonly) terms, but does not 
convert the effectiveness into monetary terms. The cost-benefit analysis assigns a monetary value to the 
perceived benefits. 
50 
• A budget that effectively meets the foregoing criteria should go far toward 
serving another important need - that of generating economic data on 
federal inputs to the national economy by meaningful activity segments. 
Assessment: this criterion is not very relevant for the ministerial level of 
decision-making. What constitutes a meaningful activity segment for 
economists outside the defense is not specified, therefore no assessment 
can be given. However, because a program budget also retains the 
traditional budget format, it can give at least as good information to 
economists as the traditional format. 
The theoretical part of the thesis is finished. The next chapter gives some 
background information about Estonian defense, its strategy, forces, goals and budgets. 
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IV.    BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
A.       THE MISSIONS OF THE ESTONIAN DEFENSE FORCES (EDF) 
The Estonian Government adopted the Estonian military strategy on February 
28th, 2001. This document will form the basis for the development of the military defense 
in coming years. Therefore, it is the central document guiding the allocation of resources. 
Generally, regardless of the country, military strategy gives missions to the forces. The 
missions then guide the identification of needed capabilities and force structures. Thus, 
the missions form an especially important part of the strategy. The Estonian military 
strategy gives missions to all services: the Army, Air Force, Navy, Defense League and 
Border Guard. The thesis examines only the services under the MoD sphere of 
administration. A brief description of the services is given later in this chapter. 
In peacetime the main missions are: 
Maintaining all units at designated readiness levels and be prepared to 
fulfill the peacetime functions 
Guaranteeing military capability of the units and their interoperability with 
NATO forces 
Preparing the units, population and territory of the state for military 
defense and for supporting international operations 
Cooperating in the framework of NATO Partnership for Peace program 
and other defense-related agreements 
Participating in providing assistance to the civilian authorities in coping 
with damage caused by natural or man-made disasters/catastrophes 
In international crisis: 
Intensifying surveillance of Estonian or adjacent airspace and control of 
Estonian airspace 
53 
Intensifying monitoring and control of the territorial waters of the state 
Preparing for transfer to wartime command structure prepared in 
peacetime and begin partial or total mobilization, integrate the units from 
other ministries 
Increasing readiness levels of designed units according to the situation 
Preparing for the reception of, and cooperation with, external assistance 
and forces 
In wartime: 
Defending national territorial integrity as directed by the defense plan and 
by lawful authorities 
Facilitating arrival and cooperation with forces from other countries, 
including holding control over sea lines to the extent possible and defend 
approaches to designated harbors and airfields 
Maintaining in cooperation with forces from other countries control over 
national airspace and defend strategic objects to the extent possible 
The strategy also identifies specific missions for individual services. In addition to 
the strategy, there is currently work progressing with the involvement of experts from the 
Center for Civil-Military Relations, Monterey, CA to fine-tune these missions for 
practical planning purposes. The current stage of the services' missions is presented next. 
Missions of the Army: 
1. Training and educating personnel according to established 
standards to include inculcating strong spirit to defend the nation 
2. Conducting training for all units at designated readiness levels 
3. Maintaining units at designated readiness levels 
4. Providing designated forces for combined exercises and operations 
with NATO and other partners 
5. Conducting coastal defense 
6. Lending designated forces, as stated in legislation, to civilian 
authorities in natural disasters, civil unrest or man-made 
catastrophes 
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7. Transition to wartime command structure 
8. Increasing readiness levels of designated units through intensifying 
training and exercising wartime tasks in case of crises 
9. By direction of the Parliament/President, mobilizing designated 
forces according to plans and standards 
10. Integrating the ground units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 
case of crises 
11. Upon approval of the government, activating of host national 
support system for external forces 
12. As directed by lawful authorities, providing ground forces to 
defend national territorial integrity 
13. Conducting j oint/combined operations 
14. Maintaining essential interior lines of communications 
The missions of the Navy: 
1. Training  and educating personnel to  established  standards to 
include inculcating a strong spirit to defend the nation 
2. Conducting training for all units at designated readiness levels 
3. Maintaining units at designated readiness levels 
4. Providing designated forces for combined exercises and operations 
with NATO and other partners 
5. Conducting maritime military surveillance 
6. Providing designated forces for coastal defense 
7. Conducting naval operations 
8. Participating in the development of seaports that are interoperable 
with the standards of NATO and other partners 
9. Providing designated forces for naval exercises and operations 
with NATO and other partners 
10. Conducting maritime search and rescue operations (peacetime) 
11. Leading and intensifying maritime surveillance (in transition to 
war) 
12. Preparing for the defense of strategically important assets from the 
sea 
13. Integrating designated maritime units from other ministries and 
civilian assets in times of crises 
14. Transition to wartime command structure in case of crises 
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15. Increasing readiness levels of designated units through intensifying 
training and exercising wartime tasks in times of crises 
16. During transition to war, and during wartime, conducting search 
and rescue 
17. Supporting the operations of defense forces with naval assets 
18. Upon approval of the government, activating the host nation 
support system for external forces 
19. Sea denial around strategic locations in wartime 
20. Securing sea lines of communication in territorial waters 
The missions of the Air Force: 
1. Training   and   educating   personnel   according   to   established 
standards to include inculcating a strong spirit to defend the nation 
2. Conducting training of all units at designated readiness levels 
3. Maintaining units at designated readiness levels 
4. Providing designated forces for combined exercises and operations 
with NATO and other partners 
5. In peacetime, providing air traffic management 
6. Developing the air situation picture 
7. Conducting air policing 
8. Providing   designated   forces   for  national   search   and   rescue 
operations 
9. Participating   in   the   development   of   airfields,   which   are 
interoperable with the standards of NATO and other partners 
10. Transition to a wartime command structure 
11. Increasing readiness levels of designated units through intensifying 
training and exercising wartime tasks in times of crises 
12. Integrating air units from Ministry of Internal Affairs and civilian 
air assets in times of crises 
13. Upon approval by the government, activating host national support 
system for external forces 
14. Providing air traffic management (transition to war) 
15. Conducting air operations, including air defense, in support of 
defense forces 
16. Conducting combined and joint air operations 
17. Combat Search and Rescue 
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The missions of the Defense League: 
1. Raising citizens' will to defend their country through training and 
patriotic activities 
2. Conducting professional training according to established tasks, 
conditions and standards 
3. Assisting civilian authorities in natural disasters or man-made 
catastrophes 
4. According to established standards, conducting refresher training 
of Territorial Defense Units 
5. Assisting in mobilization 
6. Assisting in forming national defense units (transition to war) 
7. Forming the territorial defense units at designated readiness levels 
8. Through absorption of designated units and individuals into 
national defense organization, participating in the defense of the 
country 
9. Providing remaining Defense League assets to support national 
defense 
This mission (task) list is relatively detailed. For practical purposes, to reduce the 
scope of the analysis in the following chapter to a manageable size, it seems reasonable to 
group these missions into broad packages that contain a set of missions for related 
purposes. A set of possible packages is presented next. As these packages cross 
organizational lines, the detailed missions of individual services are related to these 
packages by using codes: A means Army, F means Air Force, N means Navy and DL 
means Defense League. The numbers after characters indicate special missions of the 
services, for example: A5 denotes the fifth mission of the Army or coastal defense. The 
mission packages are: 
1. Training and Education: Al, A2, Fl, F2, Nl, N2, DL1, DL2, DL4 
2. Readiness: A3, F3, N3 
3. Alliances and Partnerships (this could further be classified into Host 
Nation Support and Participation in International Operations): A4, All, 
F4,F9,F13,N4,N8,N9,N18 
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4. Mobilization and Deployment (Transition to War): A7, A8, A9, A10, F10, 
Fl 1, F12, F14, Nl 1, N13, N14, N15, N16, DL5, DL6 
5. Wartime Operations: A5, A12, A14, F15, F16, F17, N6, N12, N17, N19, 
N20, DL7, DL8, DL9 
6. Defense Support to Civil Authorities: A6, F8, Nl0, Nl6, DL3 
7. Monitoring and Control over Airspace and Territorial Waters: F5, F6, F7, 
N5,N7 
To facilitate reading and understanding, Appendix G presents the uncoded list of 
the aforementioned packages and their constituent missions. The next section gives an 
overview of the current EDF and their development goals. 
B.       THE   ESTONIAN   DEFENSE   FORCES   AND   THE   MEDIUM-TERM 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
1. The Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) 
According to the newly approved Estonian Military Strategy, the EDF comprise 
the Regular Armed Forces and the volunteer-based organization, and the Defense League 
in peacetime. The Regular Armed Forces is comprised of army, naval and air force units. 
In wartime, a number of militarily organized agencies and units under the Ministry of 
Interior, mainly the units of the Border Guard and some rescue units, will also be 
transferred to the command of the Supreme Commander of the Defense Forces. The EDF 
personnel comprise the conscripts, the professional military and the reservists when 
called into service. The reservists comprise the bulk of the personnel. Based on the 
functions and capabilities, the EDF consist of General-Purpose Forces (Reaction Forces 
and Main Defense Forces) and territorial defense forces. 
The Army has the primary role of defending Estonian territory. Most of the Army 
units are based on the reserves. In peacetime, it consists of the Reaction Forces, the 
Territorial Forces, the Training Forces and the Supporting Forces. After mobilization, the 
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Army comprises the General-Purpose Forces, the Territorial (Defense) Forces and the 
Augmentation Forces. The peacetime Army consists of six infantry training battalions, 
one artillery training battalion, one air defense training battalion, the Peace Operations 
Center, the Estonian company of the BALTBAT, the joint battalion of the Baltic states 
that forms the nucleus of the reaction forces, and staffs. Most of the Army units are not 
considered to be combat units in peacetime, but units for the training of conscripts and 
the reserves. They are manned and equipped at various levels. In wartime, the Army will 
form regional commands. The main forces under the subordination of commands are 
brigades that are formed mainly from the reserves, and territorial defense units that are 
formed on the basis of the Defense League. 
The Air Forces are responsible for all air operations in Estonia. The structure of 
the Air Forces is similar during peace and in times of war. Based on the operational tasks 
and capabilities, the Air Force units are divided into air surveillance, rapid reaction and 
air defense. During peacetime, the Air Forces consist of an air base and an air 
surveillance battalion. 
The Navy is responsible for all naval operations. The structure of the Navy varies 
little during peace and wartime. It comprises a naval base, naval units and coastal 
defense. 
The Defense League is a voluntary defense organization. It participates in the 
preparation, activation and implementation of the territorial defense and total defense 
system. During mobilization the Defense League units will form the basis of territorial 
defense units. 
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In addition to the aforementioned units, there are a number of units under the 
direct subordination of the Chief of Defense. They include the General (Joint) Staff of the 
Defense Forces, a signals battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a logistics battalion, 
central depots, a central training area and educational institutions: a NCO school (Combat 
School) and Military Educational Establishment for preparing officers, including the 
Estonian part of the BALTDEFCOL - the Baltic Defense College for preparing staff 
officers mainly for the Baltic countries. 
The Border Guard is subordinated to the Ministry of Interior during peacetime. 
During mobilization, the designated Border Guard Units will be transferred to the 
command of the Supreme Commander of the Defense Forces. This study does not 
consider units under the Ministry of Interior's sphere of administration. 
The current peacetime EDF comprise about 5,000, including the active duty 
military and civilians, but excluding the reservists. The reservists are classified into 
various categories and the current EDF are neither able nor planning to equip and 
organize all potentially available reservists into fully equipped and trained wartime 
military units in the near future. The EDF plan to use the reservists according to the 
development goals that are described next. 
2. Medium-Term Development Goals30 
One of the priorities for the coming years is to develop a total defense system. 
This system encompasses the entire society and consists of military defense, civil 
30 This section is a brief unclassified summary based on various Estonian planning documents, and 
especially the aforementioned Estonian Military Strategy and unclassified parts of the Estonian Annual 
National Program 2000/2001 in the NATO Membership Action Plan framework and the MoD's 
"Guidelines of the Defense Forces' development for the 2001". The actual development plans are much 
more detailed. The term "medium" refers to approximately five years ahead. 
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defense, economic defense and civil preparedness. As such, this goal exceeds the 
responsibility of the MoD and requires the cooperation of all ministries and other state 
and non-state institutions. 
From the military perspective, the priority of the Army is to develop two light 
infantry brigades of the Main Defense Forces, a reaction forces battalion and the 
command and control system. Additionally it will continue the implementation of the 
territorial defense concept. The Army Staff is responsible for defining the tasks in times 
of crisis and war. The planning of the implementation of those tasks is the responsibility 
of the defense areas. They form the basis of the Army commands in wartime. 
The Air Force will continue to develop the airspace control system, including air 
surveillance and rapid reaction capability, and the Navy will concentrate on the further 
development of mine warfare capabilities. 
Although the next priorities are related to the previous goals, the more 
"international" side of the development priorities is given separately. The following 
generally applies, except the peace operations that are limited to the Army, to all three 
services and also to the civilian part of the total defense. One of the priorities is the 
development of an infrastructure that would enable Estonia to receive humanitarian and 
military assistance. The continuing participation in international bi- and multilateral 
defense-related cooperation projects and ensuring the capability to participate in peace 
operations are other priorities. To participate in collective planning and defense through 
the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), the NATO Partnership Goals (PG) initiative 
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and the NATO Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)31, a number 
of additional aspects must be taken into account by implementing the development goals 
described above. 
Both the peacetime and wartime structure of the EDF is currently under review, 
considering that the Government adopted a new military strategy document early in 2001. 
The process is expected to be completed by the end of this year. The next section 
describes the planning and budgeting process through which the above-mentioned goals 
should be carried out. 
C.       THE PLANNING AND BUDGETING PROCESS OF THE MINISTRY OF 
DEFENSE32 
The Planning and Accountancy Process (PAP) regulates the planning, the 
preparation of the budget and the accountancy process in the MoD's sphere of 
administration. A summary of these procedures follows. The MoD and the Chief of 
Defense work out the perspective development plan of the Defense Forces for the period 
of 10-15 years and the long-term investment projects. On the view of the prospective 
development plan, the MoD submits the structure of the Regular Armed Forces and the 
Defense League, as well as the proposals for the formation, re-formation, dismissal and 
location of the units to the Government for approval. 
31 NATO provided 62 Partnership Goals to the aspiring members that should guide the development 
towards interoperability of the candidate members' forces with NATO forces. The PGs cover diverse areas, 
from specifying the English language skill requirements to requirements to the doctrine and standards of 
communications. The MAP and PARP also contribute to the achievement of interoperability and facilitate 
the fulfillment of the technical criteria for potential NATO membership. The scope and focus of the thesis 
and the classification requirements do not allow nor require giving a detailed picture here. 
32 This section is based on the "Guidance for the Conducting of the PAP in the MoD and its Sphere of 
Administration". 
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The PAP has several basic documents: the five-year development plan of the 
Defense Forces, the draft budget of the MoD's sphere of administration, and the annual 
activity report of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Defense. The Defense Forces' 
five-year development plan directs the activity and development of the Defense Forces 
during five years, beginning from the year after next33, following the approval of the 
document. In the course of an annual review, one new planned year is added. After the 
approval of the five-year development plan, the MoD's draft budget serves as the basis 
for the drafting of the annual development plans of the Defense Forces. The five-year 
development plan is drafted by the Chief of Defense proceeding from: 
The defense policy guidance for the drafting of a five-year development 
plan of the Defense Forces, presented by the MoD 
The Structure of the Defense Forces approved by the Government and the 
employed personnel of the Regular Armed Forces and the Defense League 
approved by the Ministry of Defense 
The perspective development plan and the long-term investment projects 
of the Defense Forces, prepared on the ground of the Guidelines34 
The draft budget of the MoD's sphere of administration is prepared by the MoD 
proceeding from: 
The draft budgets of the organizations in its sphere of administration 
The limits set to expenses by the Ministry of Finance 
The Defense Forces' five-year development plan completed at the end of 
the previous year 
33 In practice, however, the first year of the five-year development plan has been equal to the next 
budget year. 
34 "The Guidelines of the Defense Policy", approved by the Parliament in 1996, was until recently, the 
most influential long-term planning guidance for the development. The Government approved the national 
security and military strategies early in 2001. As a result, the importance of the Guidelines is likely to 
decrease. The Guidelines may be also amended, but this is currently not certain. 
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During the planning year, the MoD prepares the PAP subdocuments through 
which it manages and co-ordinates the planning of the development of the Defense 
Forces, the implementation of the plans and the review process. The MoD prepares 
several subdocuments, two of which are relevant to this study: 
The aforementioned defense policy priorities for the drafting of the 
Defense Forces' five-year development plan - this document provides 
defense policy and general budgetary guidance 
Defense policy priorities for the drafting of the MoD's draft budget - this 
document provides defense policy and budgetary guidance for the 
preparation of the Chief of Defense's draft budget and annual 
development plans 
In the course of the PAP, the Chief of Defense submits to the MoD the PAP 
subdocuments  through  which  the  planning   and  review  of the   Defense   Forces' 
development is carried out. These subdocuments relevant for this study are the following: 
Guidelines of the Defense Forces' development for the next year. The 
document is presented to the Minister of Defense in response to the 
MoD's defense policy priorities outlined in the guidance for the drafting 
of the draft budget and the annual development plans. The Chief of 
Defense also presents his initial proposals regarding the budget allocations 
for the next year. 
Chief of Defense's draft budget - official proposals regarding the national 
defense budget allocations for the next year, submitted to the Minister of 
Defense by the Chief of Defense. 
For the conduct of the PAP, a number of planning meetings on several levels is 
carried out. As a result of these meetings, the Chief of Defense presents his final version 
of the five-year and annual development plans and the final next year's budget proposal. 
D.   THE STRUCTURE OF THE ESTONIAN DEFENSE BUDGET 
When the MoD prepares its budget proposal to the Ministry of Finance and when 
the Chief of Defense and the administrative units under direct subordination of the MoD 
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present their budget proposals to the MoD, they are not free to structure the budget any 
way they like. The budget structure must conform to the State Budget Act that provides 
the overall framework and to the regulations of the Minister of Finances that specify the 
details of the mandatory part of the budget structure. Although the state budget comprises 
both revenues and expenditures, the thesis examines only the expenditure side of the 
Ministry of Defense's sphere of administration, which is the defense budget35. The MoD 
sphere of administration has also some revenues, but their volume is so insignificant that 
it would not justify their inclusion in the study. The structure of the defense budget can 
be divided into three broad levels of detail. On the highest level, the State Budget Act 
gives several requirements. On a somewhat lower level, other regulations specify the 
rules. On a still lower level of detail, the ministries and other agencies and institutions 
finally have discretion to structure the information according to their needs within the 
framework established by the aforementioned documents. However, in this case the 
Minister of Finance must be informed of these changes. How these requirements 
influence the budget structure is presented next. 
1. Requirements   from   the   State   Budget   Act   -   Broad   Level   of 
Classification 
The budget must be composed for one budget year that begins on January 1st and 
ends on December 31st. The expenditures and revenues must be given in nominal terms 
and are classified in various parts, chapters and articles: 
35 The thesis considers the budget of the MoD sphere of administration synonymous to the defense 
budget. Actual life is somewhat more complicated. Although the major part of the budget of the Ministry of 
Interior's sphere of administration would not qualify as defense-related, some expenditures, especially 
those incurred by the Border Guard and Rescue Service could also be partially classified as defense-related. 
To an even lesser extent, some expenditures incurred by other ministries could also be defense-related 
depending on the criteria that are selected to recognize defense expenditures. However, because of their 
small size, similar basic budget structure (same budget articles are used) and the fact that the MoD has no 
direct control over those expenditures, leaving the other ministries out does not have a significant impact on 
the study. 
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• Parts - they are classified according to administrative lines and obligations 
specified by various laws. The parts are the Riigikogu (Parliament), 
President, State Chancellery, Supreme Court, the spheres of administration 
of the ministries and some other organizations. The whole defense budget 
falls into one part - the sphere of administration of the Ministry of 
Defense. 
• Chapters - this is functional classification that comprises government 
agencies, and lower lever agencies under the administration of the former, 
several other legal persons and groups of expenditures. The defense 
budget chapters are specified by the regulation of the minister of finance. 
• Articles - they are classified according to the economic content of the 
expenditure. The Minister of Finance specifies those articles that the 
Ministry of Defense cannot define itself. 
The Minister of Finance authorizes the principal list of parts, chapters and articles. 
It is collectively called the classification of revenues and expenditures, but this refers to 
several documents. The government on the proposal of the Finance Minister determines 
the  extent to  which the revenues  and expenditures are to be classified,  but the 
aforementioned classification of revenues and expenditures is to be taken as a basis. 
2. Requirements from the Classification of Revenues and Expenditures - 
Medium Classification Level 
As mentioned before, the classification of revenues and expenditures is a 
collective term referring to several documents. Two of these have relevance for the 
defense budget expenditure structure. The first one, the "Classification of the State 
Expenditures by Administrative Arrangement and Functional Purpose" (^Riigi kulude 
klassifikaator administratiivse jaotuse ja funktsionaalse otstarbe järgi") specifies the 
parts and chapters of the state budget, including the defense budget. It is quite a long 
document, but the defense part is relatively small. Therefore, the list of the defense 
budget chapters is given here in full detail. The numbers before the names of parts and 
chapters indicate the part/chapter codes given to them by that document: 
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Part 132: Ministry of Defense 
Chapters: 
01 Ministry of Defense 
02 Defense Attaches 
03 Information Service 
04 Funds for Results-Oriented Management 
10 The Institutions and Organizations of the MoD 
11 Educational Institutions of the Regular Armed Forces 
30 General (Joint) Staff of the Defense Forces 
40 Military Units of the Regular Armed Forces 
52 NATO Partnership for Peace Program 
53 Defense-Related Projects 
60 National Defense Departments 
81 Defense League 
91 Special Equipments and Military Clothing 
97 Investments of the MoD Sphere of Administration 
98 Other Expenditures of the MoD Sphere of Administration 
The other document, "Classification of the State Expenditures by Economic 
Content" ("Riigi kulude klassifikaator majandusliku sisu järgi"), specifies the codes36 
and names of those budget articles the usage of which is mandatory to everybody in the 
Estonian state apparatus. It specifies all articles with up to three digit codes. The names 
and codes of the articles are not given here in full detail, because of their length and little 
relevance of every detail to the analysis that follows in the next chapter. If some more 
details are necessary for the analysis presented in the next chapter, they are given directly 
in the analysis. Examples of articles important for the defense budget follow: 
36 The articles have codes that specify their level of aggregation. One-digit articles are just broad 
classes of expenditures such as operating costs. Two-digit articles are more specific. The Parliament 
approves the state budget at the level of two-digit articles. Three-digit articles are the lowest level of 
classification that are predetermined by the minister of finance. 
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1. Operating Costs (summarizes Articles 10-49) 
1.1. Personnel Costs (summarizes Articles 10-29) 
Articles 1. and 1.1. are one-digit articles, such articles are specified for grouping 
purposes, but they are not specifically mentioned in the actual budget. 
10 Salaries and Wages (a two-digit article summarizing Articles 11-19) 
11 Salaries of Public Servants 
Although this is also a two-digit article, it is subordinate to Article 10 specifying a part of 
it. 
111 Base Salary 
This is a three-digit article that specifies a part of Article 11 
21 Social Tax 
26 Aids 
27 Compensations 
The Articles from 21 to 29 are personnel costs other than salaries and wages. They are 
not grouped together similarly as article 10 does for salaries and wages. 
1.2. Maintenance Costs 
This also Article 30 at the same time and summarizes Articles 31-36 and 48-49. 
31 Chancellery costs 
32 Maintenance Costs of Registered Immovables, Buildings and Rooms 
321 Heating 
322 Electricity 
35 Operations and Maintenance of Vehicles 
351 Fuel 
Articles 37-47 summarize very different things, e.g. 37 Information Technology 
(procurement of hardware and software and projects, information systems etc.), 41 
Catering, 42 Medicines and Binding Materials, 46 Defense-Related Equipment, Inventory 
and Materials (e.g. 462 Clothing, Belts and Footwear, 466 Armament, 467 Naval 
Vessels) 
54 Transfers to Other Sectors to Partially or Totally Compensate Incurred 
Costs 
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3. Capital Expenditures (Investments) (summary of Articles 71-73) (e.g. 
73 Capital Repairs, 76 Procurement of Movables and Animals, e.g. 761 
Passenger Cars, 77 Procurement of Immovables etc.) 
5. Other Costs (articles 91-99), e.g. 91 Operating Costs (Articles 10-49) 
The actual defense budget structure is marginally different. The most obvious 
example is a separate category such as maintenance costs (Ülalpidamiskulud) in the 
budget that includes not only the maintenance costs (Majandamiskulud) (Article 30) but 
also social tax and wages and salaries (Articles 21 and 10)37. 
3.        Lower Levels of Expenditure Classification 
Given that the predetermined framework presented above is followed, the 
organizations are free to undertake further classifications of expenditures. The previously 
mentioned classification documents specify the articles up to the three-digit level. This 
means the classification into four-digit articles and further is not centrally regulated. For 
example, Article 351 Fuel as a subcategory of Article 35 Operation and Maintenance of 
Vehicles is currently classified further as Article 3511 Fuel for Cars, Article 3512 Fuel 
for Ships and Article 3513 Fuel for Aircraft. However, the predetermined framework 
seriously limits the freedom of budgeters in creating new expenditure categories. In 
general, the four-digit articles build the lowest level of defense budget classification at 
present. Appendix F gives the structure of the defense budget as approved by the 
Estonian Parliament. The budgets of individual military units from the battalion level and 
up have essentially the same structure, except that they are more detailed than the budget 
37 It must be taken into account that the terminology used in Estonia may eventually differ from that 
used in the U.S.. 
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specified by the Parliament: the expenditures are classified up to the level of four-digit 
articles. 
How suitable this budget structure is for different purposes is the main topic of the 
next chapter. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE ESTONIAN DEFENSE BUDGET 
STRUCTURE 
A.       FUNCTIONS   AT   WHICH   THE   CURRENT   BUDGET   STRUCTURE 
EXCELS 
The previous chapter identified that the current state budget structure is based on 
parts, chapters and articles. The whole MoD budget is a part of the state budget, in both 
the general sense of the word as well as in the technical sense. It is part 132 of the state 
budget. This classification allows the government to compare the expenditure totals that 
are allocated between different broad functions of the government such as defense, 
internal security, education and the environment. Therefore, the classification of the state 
budget into parts makes sense from the point of view of the whole government. From the 
point of view of the MoD/General (Joint) Staff, this classification is too broad for almost 
any purposes, except to argue for the "adequate" share from the state budget for defense. 
Thus, the thesis will not investigate further the largest category of the budget: parts. 
The next level of categories in the defense budget are chapters. Generally, the 
largest administrative or military units in the broad sense, including staffs, and military 
schools or their groups, are separate budget chapters. Another group of chapters forms 
various groups of expenditures, mostly for capital investments or central procurement 
both for capital investments and day-to-day operations that are not included in the 
budgets of separate organizational entities. This classification, at least the operating part 
of it that is allocated among organizational entities, gives important information to the 
administration because the administrative units mentioned in the budget can see the size 
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of their budget and the amounts in different expenditure categories they can spend next 
year. 
Finally, the articles specify on which objects of expenditure money can be spent 
and how much money there is to spend. The fact that the Parliament approves the budget 
separately for individual two-digit articles constrains the freedom of administrators to 
allocate resources between different articles. However, because the administrators have 
freedom to allocate resources among lower-level articles they still have some flexibility. 
The current budget format allows classifying and specifying the budget 
expenditures at the level of detail that is needed in a concrete case. There is theoretically 
no limit to the number of lower level budget articles that can be created in individual 
organizations, provided that the mandatory classification structure of up to three-digit 
articles is used as a base. The mandatory part of classification focuses on things to buy 
such as procurement, or a type of expenditure such as salaries for officers. In other words, 
this budget classification excels at showing objects of expenditure at various levels of 
aggregation. Using the information from Chapter II about different budget formats, it is 
clear that this budget format is that of a line-item budget. 
According to Schick's (1978) classification given in Chapter II, this type of 
budget format is the best at fulfilling the first function of budget classification may serve: 
control. The Estonian defense budget is built on objects of expenditure. This makes it 
relatively easy to ensure that funds are spent only on those expenditure classes that were 
allowed, for example, on wages to officers or on electricity or heating to maintain the 
buildings. This format also makes it relatively easy to check whether particular budget 
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accounts, or in Estonia's case, the budget articles are being overspent. That all budget 
proposals from MoD sphere of administration to MoD must indicate the funds, or the 
average number of personnel positions and other input-type indicators, approved in the 
previous year, the current year and the next year38 for different articles, makes it possible 
to compare the percentage changes in the budget and gives hints on where to question the 
requested incremental changes from the previous year. Control is an important element of 
parliamentary oversight over spending and keeping the state solvent. That all state 
institutions must use the same budget articles makes it relatively easy for the Ministry of 
Finance to compare the same expenditure groups or articles in general and question 
sizable differences in expenditures in comparable agencies. The importance of this 
function cannot be underestimated. Control is also an important element of civilian 
oversight over the military. However, is this format also suitable for making rational 
decisions for implementing military strategy and development goals? This aspect of the 
budget classification process is examined in the following parts of this chapter. First, the 
analysis discusses the criteria for rational decision making identified in Chapter II and 
assesses their relevance from the Estonian MoD perspective. Then the analysis specifies 
the meaning of the selected criteria in the case of Estonia. The actual analysis of the 
budget structure using those criteria forms the last analytical part of the chapter. 
B.        SELECTION AND SPECIFICATION OF ASSESSMENT CRITERIA FOR 
RATIONAL DECISION MAKING 
Relying to Anshen (1969, pp. 10-11), Chapter II identified several criteria a 
budget structure should meet to support rational decisions. On the other hand, they were 
identified to the government as a whole and may or may not be suitable for the Estonian 
38 This is required by the order from 13 March 2000 of the Minister of Defense. 
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Situation. Therefore, their applicability to the Estonian case is assessed next and if a 
particular criterion is relevant to the MoD/General Staff, then this general criterion is 
specified for the Estonian case. 
• The budget design should facilitate a meaningful measurement of the total 
money costs of accomplishing the defined objectives. In the military 
budget, for example, this would mean a statement of the full costs of a 
proposed new missile system, research and development, investment and 
operation 
This first criterion makes sense in general. By identifying the total money costs of 
the proposed activities or procurement, better decisions can be made in the MoD. In the 
Estonian context, the defined objectives could be the missions given by the military 
strategy. In a more specific sense, the objectives are the procurement of weapon systems 
or other equipment and building infrastructure. Regarding the mid-term objectives, 
developing two light infantry brigades, a reaction forces battalion and command and 
control system would the objectives for the Army. In the case of the Air Force, 
developing an airspace control system and in case of the Navy, developing the mine 
warfare capabilities, would be their specific objectives. 
• The budget structure should facilitate the comparison of alternative ways 
to accomplish a given objective. A military example might be the 
comparison of full time-based costs of a submarine-based missile system 
with a comparable cost display for a land-based missile 
This second criterion also makes sense in the Estonian case. Giving alternatives 
widens the options the decision makers can have and that is relevant also in the MoD 
case. The given objectives would be the missions specified by the Estonian military 
strategy and the alternatives would show different ways to carry out the missions and 
their costs. 
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• The budget presentation should clearly identify the future cost 
implications inherent in near-term financial commitments 
This third criterion is extremely important, because in the past there have been 
projects in the MoD's sphere of administration that were started first, but then cancelled 
because of the lack of funding. The MoD is interested in avoiding similar situations in the 
future. This criterion applies to all decisions that have potentially large future cost 
implications, especially to the procurement of major equipment, the development of 
infrastructure and, on a more general level, the establishment of new military units, and 
here developing two infantry brigades is the most important mid-term goal, necessary to 
carry out the missions of the strategy. Whereas the third criterion deals only with future 
costs, the first criterion focuses on the total costs of the objectives. Usually the largest 
part of the costs of large projects started today is incurred in the future. In this sense 
criterion three is related to criterion one. 
• The budget design should facilitate a comparison of cost inputs and 
achievement outputs when related segments of a single program are 
administered by different management units. An example might be 
hospital services under the direction of the Veterans Administration versus 
hospital services under another jurisdiction 
This fourth criterion is also extremely important, because a number of 
management units are often involved in the same programs. The EDF missions often 
cross organizational lines. An example would be the training of conscripts and the 
reserves, or the coastal defense. 
• The budget design should delineate the objectives of discrete spending 
commitments in such terms that significant cost-effectiveness (cost-utility) 
analysis can be carried out. There are obvious limitations on our ability to 
define measurable goals, or even measurable progress toward such 
goals...Nevertheless, the budget design should seek continually to expand 
the area of informed analysis 
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Following costs and effectiveness in the same package should be the goal of all 
management units and the MoD sphere of administration is not an exception. Of course, 
assessing costs and effectiveness makes sense only if there are alternatives from which to 
choose. In this sense, the fifth criterion is related to the second criterion and supports it. 
In the sense of comparing costs and effectiveness (achievement outputs), this criterion 
relates to criterion four. 
• The budget design should make it possible to aggregate related 
expenditures whenever they occur in the government's sprawling 
administrative structure 
This sixth criterion seems to be a subset of the fourth criterion. In the Estonian 
case, the related expenditures incurred in the MoD sphere of administration should relate 
to the accomplishment of the missions or the mid-term development goals. 
• A budget that effectively meeting the foregoing criteria should go far 
toward serving another important need - that of generating economic data 
on federal inputs to the national economy by meaningful activity segments 
This seventh criterion is mainly important to people outside the individual 
government agencies. The MoD does not deal with the national economy as a whole. 
Therefore this criterion, although important in itself, is irrelevant for the decision makers 
in the MoD and will therefore not be used in the following analysis. 
C.        THE CURRENT BUDGET STRUCTURE AND RATIONAL DECISION 
MAKING 
The analysis focuses on two broad issues. First, since the military strategy that 
gives missions to the forces was approved only recently whereas the budget structure is 
relatively old, it would be unrealistic to expect that the current budget structure would 
exactly allow showing the expenditures that are needed to fulfill different missions. A 
budget structure aligned with missions can be developed only after the missions are 
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known. Nevertheless, the first aspect of the analysis assesses how much the current 
budget structure is aligned with the missions. Of course in the case of the missions, there 
is no hope for calculating the total costs of carrying out the missions for an unlimited 
time in the future. The mission-oriented analysis focuses on five years ahead. Second, the 
EDF have a number of mid-term development goals that were described in the last 
chapter and they existed also before officially adopting the strategy. Therefore, the 
second aspect of the analysis assesses how much the budget structure is aligned with 
those development goals. The rationale behind this is the assumption that the attainment 
of these goals serves as the proxy for the security value of the defense preparations and 
hence also of the defense budget. On the following pages the analysis gives the 
assessment criteria specified by Anshen (1969, pp. 10-11) and modified in the previous 
section and then analyses of how much the budget structure satisfies them. 
1.        Criterion One and the Budget Structure 
The budget design should facilitate the meaningful measurement of the total 
money costs of accomplishing the missions of the strategy, development and operating 
force structures, infrastructure and procurement and operations of major equipment. 
a. First Mission Package: Training and Education 
In the budget structure, there does not exist a category, chapter or article 
that is called training and education. The closest classifications in the budget are Chapter 
11 (Educational Institutions) for education and Chapter 40 (Military Units) for training. 
The problem with those chapters is that they do not include all the costs that are incurred 
by training and education. At the same time, they include costs that are incurred by 
carrying out other broad mission packages. 
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First, these chapters do not include the costs for Information Technology 
(Article 37), central procurement (in Chapter 91) and infrastructure (in Chapter 97) that 
are incurred by training and education. Moreover, Chapter 91 does not separate 
procurement, for example, of ammunition, for training and education, and procurement 
for other purposes, for example, ammunition for mobilization reserves. In general, the 
budget articles concerning procurement group together similar objects regardless of their 
purpose. For example, Article 46 (Defense-Related Equipment) is subdivided into 461 
Ammunition, 462 Clothing, Belts and Footwear, 466 Armament etc., but no separate 
article exists for ammunition for training and ammunition for mobilization reserves or for 
clothing for training and clothing for the reserves. 
Second, besides the training unit budgets, Chapter 40 also includes 
organizations that have little or nothing to do with training and education, for example 
the Air Force staff or central depots. Regarding Chapter 11, although giving education 
and training is the main purpose of the educational institutions, they may also have to 
contribute to other broad mission packages such as ensuring readiness and transition to 
wartime, but the current budget structure does not distinguish between these packages. 
b. Second Mission Package: Readiness 
Although there are reaction forces such as the reaction forces battalion in 
the Army and the reaction capability of the Air Force, in Estonia, the budget does not 
identify the costs for readiness in Chapter 40 nor in any other chapter. In a more general 
sense, all military units must be in the predetermined state of readiness that may or may 
not have something to do with training. In any case, there are no separate readiness 
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articles or chapters in the budget and the costs for readiness are not identifiable in any 
other sense. 
c. Third Mission Package: Alliances and Partnerships 
The closest to this mission package are Chapters 02 (Defense Attaches), 
52 (Partnership for Peace) and 53 (Defense-Related Projects: Peace Operations Center, 
and the Baltic projects, the Baltic naval squadron BALTRON, the Baltic battalion 
BALTBAT and the Baltic air surveillance project BALTNET) and parts of Chapter 97 
(infrastructure that also includes development of infrastructure for host nation support). 
As compared with previous mission packages, this package is relatively well identifiable 
in the budget. Once again, however, central procurement for this package is not separated 
from procurement for other mission packages. 
This is also a good place to illustrate the dilemmas of budget classification 
if it is done not on the basis of objects of expenditure, but of purpose. The dilemma arises 
from the multiple purposes the same activities such as equipment can have. For example, 
if an Estonian military unit is participating in an international military exercise, it may 
contribute to the Alliances and Partnerships mission package. At the same time, 
participating in an international operation or exercise may contribute to the training, 
readiness and so on. Yet, for budgeting purposes, the same cost may be only counted 
once. The same applies to the Baltic projects. The BALTBAT project is an important 
element for establishing the rapid reaction capability (mission package: Readiness), and 
the BALTRON and BALTNET contribute not only to the partnerships package, but also 
to the last mission package (Monitoring and Control of Airspace and Territorial Waters). 
How to divide their costs is entirely judgmental. 
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d. Fourth Mission Package: Mobilization and Deployment 
The closest related thing in the budget is Chapter 60 (National Defense 
Departments). The National Defense Departments are responsible for calling conscripts 
and reservists into service and keeping records on them. They also play a critical role in 
activating mobilization plans. However, the National Defense Departments are not part of 
the three services. They are the under direct subordination of the MoD. No budget 
chapter or article is directly associated with this mission package in the services. As a 
result, whether and how much costs arise in the individual services to guarantee a smooth 
transition from peacetime to wartime, is impossible to see from the current budget. 
e. Fifth Mission Package: Wartime Operations 
This category includes a number of individual service missions that were 
related to wartime activities. After a transition from peacetime structure to wartime 
structure, the mobilization reserves can be used for conducting wartime operations. 
Taking this into consideration, the peacetime budget should identify the procurement and 
maintenance of wartime reserves under this package. Other costs are likely to be already 
included in other packages. The training of wartime units and a transition from peace to 
war was already included in the first and fourth packages, so this does not need counting 
any more. There is no budget chapter or article that would separate procurement for 
training and everyday operations and procurement for mobilization reserves. The already 
mentioned Chapter 91 classifies all purchases according to objects, not according to the 
purposes of those objects. Thus, procurement of mobilization reserves is not identifiable. 
Regarding maintenance of these resources, there is also no chapter or article indicating 
the costs of maintaining the mobilization reserves such as the cost of warehouses or 
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guarding. If a mobilization depot is built, the money comes from Chapter 97 
(Investments) that again does not distinguish between the purposes of the buildings. 
/ Sixth Mission Package: Defense Support to Civil Authorities 
Although this is an important mission package, there is no budget chapter 
or article that would encompass this issue. 
g.        Seventh Mission Package: Monitoring and Control over Airspace 
and Territorial Waters 
There is no budget chapter, article or a combination that would capture the 
whole package. The closest in the budget are the operating budgets of the Air Force staff, 
the Airbase, the Navy, the BALTRON and the BALTNET in Chapter 40, but they do not 
include capital investment and central procurement. Their operating budgets again 
include not only costs for this package, but also costs for all other packages in these units. 
The classification problems with the BALTRON and the BALTNET were already 
mentioned in the Alliances and Partnerships package. Their budgets must belong here or 
there, but not to both places at the same time unless their budgets are allocated to both 
packages by using some of the same rules of thumb. 
h.        Budget Structure and the Development Goals 
If the budget structure scores poorly at classifying costs around the 
mission packages for obvious reasons such as the missions are new and the budget 
structure is old, maybe it would be better to link the development goals with their costs. 
One of the most important mid-term goals was the development of two infantry brigades. 
There is no indication in the budget of how much money will be spent in the budget year 
for this purpose. The money is dispersed among a variety of chapters and articles. For 
example, money for training would come from the operating budgets of the training units, 
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such as salaries for trainers, operating costs of the training units like heating, water, 
catering costs, and training ammunition would come from Chapter 91. Chapter 91 would 
also include procurement of mobilization reserves for these brigades. These various 
chapters and articles do not specifically identify costs for developing these brigades and 
costs for some other purposes such as the development of rapid reaction capabilities or a 
command and control system. Another shortfall of the budget structure is especially clear 
here. The development of a brigade is not a task for one year, but for several years ahead, 
but the budget structure includes only costs for one budget year. As a result, the budget 
structure lacks the time dimension necessary to show the total cost of this goal. The same 
applies to the development of other military units or capabilities like the airspace control 
system in the Air Force or mine warfare capability in the Navy. The costs identified by 
chapters and articles group costs by objects of expenditure, not by purpose. 
Even if a much less ambitious goal is selected, such as the total cost of a 
major weapon system, the budget identifies directly only the immediate procurement 
costs and does not consider the subsequent operating costs such as R&D which is 
practically irrelevant in the Estonian case. The same problem arises with the development 
of major objects of infrastructure. Only the immediate construction costs are readily 
identifiable. Despite these deficiencies, the total costs of multi-year procurement and 
construction initiatives that go into Chapter 97 (investments, mostly infrastructure), and 
central   procurement   in   Chapter   91   are   sometimes   better   identified   than   other 
expenditures, although not because of the superior structure of these chapters. Although 
the annual budget structure does not include costs for the years after the budget year, at 
least the procurement costs of these large projects are estimated outside the budget for the 
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entire period of their completion. This is because in the case of multi-year procurement or 
construction, contracts must be signed with private companies, which deliver equipment 
or undertake construction. At the same time, however, this costing neither pays enough 
attention to the operating and maintenance costs of the newly built infrastructure or 
purchased equipment, nor are these cost projections obvious in the budget structure. 
/. Conclusion 
Regarding mission packages, the current budget structure for the most part 
does not identify even the annual costs that are incurred by carrying out the major 
mission packages, not to mention the total costs of a multi-year enterprise. Regarding the 
development of wartime brigades and other major development goals, the budget articles 
do not identify the total money costs for achieving these goals. First, the budget focuses 
on one year only, whereas the development of wartime forces and capabilities takes a 
number of years. The other shortfall is that the budget does not group the costs around 
development goals (wartime forces) that should be the ultimate purpose of the 
expenditures, but around the objects of these expenditures. 
2. Criterion Two and the Budget Structure 
The budget structure should facilitate the comparison of alternative ways to 
accomplish given objectives: carrying out the broad mission packages or accomplishing 
the broad development goals. 
a. First Mission Package: Training and Education 
Of course, a choice is possible only if there are alternatives from which to 
choose. In case of officers and the NCOs, the Educational Institutions of the Regular 
Armed Forces are the only organizations capable of giving officer education and NCO 
training. In this sense, it would be unreasonable to demand developing alternative 
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institutions for the sake of having an alternative in the budget if the current ones are 
satisfactory. However, there may be alternatives regarding the number of people that 
must be educated or trained in a year to satisfy the requirements for educated people. In 
this sense, the budget does not present any alternatives but only lists the budget articles in 
Chapter 11. Again, because the costs of central procurement or construction incurred by 
giving education or training is not associated with Chapter 11, this chapter does not even 
illustrate the costs for one alternative by listing all the costs for officer and NCO 
education and training. Regarding the training of conscripts and the reserves, a number of 
military units, mainly from the Army, but to a certain extent from all services, conduct 
conscript and reserve training. The budget does identify training units as a package. The 
operating budgets of most military units are combined into Chapter 40. Although the 
Parliament approves the operating budgets (Chapter 40) of most military units as a 
package, it is possible to divide Chapter 40 into operating budgets for its constituent 
military units. When this is done the picture becomes clearer, because then the operating 
budgets of military training units can be presented together with the number of 
people/wartime units a particular training unit could train in a budget year. Yet, the 
current budget presentation of a training unit as part of Chapter 40 does not identify the 
number of people/wartime units that this unit is planning to train with the budget. In this 
sense there are no conscript/reserve training alternatives in the budget. Furthermore, the 
military training units do not have training budgets, but operating budgets that identify all 
operating costs of the units, not just training costs. Therefore, the operating budgets of the 
military training units cannot be equated with training costs, because the units may 
contribute to several mission packages and because some costs incurred by training are 
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not included in the operating budgets. Another question is connected with the 
maintenance costs of the peacetime units. These costs are not directly associated with 
training or any other mission package, but they are necessary to keep the unit functioning 
regardless of what it does. These costs may or may not be charged to the training package 
depending on the currently missing agreement of where to charge these costs. 
b. Second Mission Package: Readiness 
The analysis under the previous criterion identified that the budget does 
not separate costs for readiness from other costs. Therefore, the costs of maintaining 
readiness are unknown. The budget does not also identify alternative readiness levels that 
could be achieved by different funding levels either in individual units or in the armed 
forces in general. The budget also does not present alternatives on how to keep units at 
predetermined level of readiness and the costs of these alternatives. 
c. Third Mission Package: Alliances and Partnerships 
The budget does not identify any alternative ways and their costs of 
providing forces for international operations. The same is true for providing host nation 
support. The costs of two possible alternatives, providing host nation support for ships or 
host nation support for aircraft, are not identifiable. 
d Fourth Mission Package: Mobilization and Deployment 
The analysis done under the first criterion could not even identify costs for 
carrying out the missions in this package. Consequently, no alternatives can be identified. 
e. Fifth Mission Package: Wartime Operations 
The analysis done under first criterion could not identify even one 
alternative. As a consequence, the budget also does not identify alternative ways and their 
costs of carrying out the missions in this package. 
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/ Sixth Mission Package: Defense Support to Civil Authorities 
The analysis done under previous criteria did not find even a single way 
and its costs to carry out the missions in this package. 
g.        Seventh Mission Package: Monitoring and Control over Airspace 
and Territorial Waters 
There are no alternatives in the budget.  The costs of two possible 
alternatives, control over airspace and control over territorial waters, are not identifiable. 
h.        Budget Structure and the Development Goals 
The analysis of the previous criteria identified the lack of correspondence 
between the budget chapters and on the one hand and articles and the development goals 
on the other. Therefore, there is no obvious way to allocate or reallocate money among 
those goals in the budget, because doing so would require knowledge about the 
correspondence of budget articles with development goals. There are also no alternatives 
in the budget regarding how the increased budget could increase, how the decreased 
funding would decrease the achievement of goals or how the funds allocated to a 
particular goal could be alternatively used. 
L Conclusion 
There are no alternatives in the budget at all, neither for carrying out the 
missions of the strategy nor carrying out the development goals. Therefore, the second 
criterion of rational decision-making is completely unsatisfied. 
3. Criterion Three and the Budget Structure 
The budget presentation should clearly identify the future cost implications 
inherent in near-term big financial commitments, procurement of major equipment, 
development of infrastructure or generally, developing wartime forces. 
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As presented in the previous chapter, the budget structure includes only 
expenditures for the current budget year, and the budget proposal includes only 
expenditures for the next year. Therefore, there is no place in the budget that would allow 
for the presentation of future cost implications of procurement, construction or any other 
financial commitment. The costs for procurement and construction are separated from the 
costs of operations and no part, in the general sense, of the budget links together the 
operating costs of these newly procured equipment or constructed buildings and the 
immediate costs of their procurement or construction. The costs of near term financial 
commitments could be included in the budget by projecting the budget into several years 
ahead, a hypothetical exercise today. In this case, it would be possible to show the 
resulting increases in the costs of operations of the administrative units and capital 
investments and the criterion is better satisfied. However, even in this case, it is only 
possible to see the totals in the form of budget chapters and articles like Article 32 
(Maintenance Costs of Registered Immovables, Buildings and Rooms) and Article 35 
(Operations and Maintenance of Vehicles) for operations, Chapter 97 for investments and 
Article 37 (Information Technology) for both operations and investment. These 
chapters/articles do not distinguish between operating costs of existing and planned 
buildings, equipment or military units. They only summarize all the costs of the same 
input type. In other words, the future cost implications of near-term financial 
commitments would then be included in the budget, but not separated from costs of past 
commitments. The biggest problem, however, is that the budget structure does not 
consider future years after the next budget year. As a result, the budget is unable to 
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clearly identify the future cost implications of near-term financial commitments even if 
they are known. 
4. Criterion Four and the Budget Structure 
The budget design should facilitate a comparison between cost inputs and 
achievement outputs by carrying out the missions of the strategy or implementing the 
broad development goals when related segments of a single mission package are 
administered by different management units. 
The mission packages identified in the previous chapter almost always cross 
organizational lines. If the ability to carry out the missions is considered as an 
achievement output, then some operationally defined measures are necessary to assess 
whether the missions are carried out as prescribed or not. The application of the first 
criterion identified a weak or nonexistent link between the mission packages or the 
achievement outputs, and budget chapters and articles or the cost inputs. The budget also 
does not present any achievement output measures. For example, for the first mission 
package, the achievement output measure could be the number of trained individuals or 
the number of trained military units, but they are not included in the budget. Some broad 
measures, for example, the total number of conscripts planned to be called to service, are 
currently included in the general explanatory notes accompanying the budget request, but 
they do not generally link these measures with costs. For mission packages other than 
training, the budget request does not even identify these broad measures. The budget 
presentation by chapters and articles also does not identify how the costs are related to 
the alternative achievement outputs, having two fully equipped and trained light infantry 
brigades ready in the mid-term, developing airspace control system or mine warfare 
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capability in the predetermined number of years and so on. As a result, criterion four is 
not satisfied, regardless of whether mission packages or development goals are used as 
achievement outputs. 
5. Criterion Five and the Budget Structure 
The  budget   design   should   delineate  the   objectives   of discrete   spending 
commitments in such terms that significant cost-effectiveness (cost-utility) analysis can 
be executed. 
Doing cost-effectiveness analysis requires an agreement on how to measure costs 
and effectiveness. Currently there is no agreement in Estonia about these issues. In the 
framework of mission packages, effectiveness should be measured in terms of how a 
spending commitment contributes to the missions. For example, relevant questions could 
be how the costs for procurement of a radar system would contribute to airspace control 
in terms of needed area coverage (and no more) in package seven and how this compares 
with the costs of training a number of conscripts in package one, or with the cost of 
developing a host nation support capability in an airport in package three. Obviously, the 
current budget does not identify nor use effectiveness measures. In this sense, the fifth 
criterion is not satisfied, but this is not only the problem in the budget structure, but also 
in the lack of agreed effectiveness measures. Regarding cost inputs, the analysis under 
previous criteria identified a gap between the line items and the mission packages, or line 
items and the development goals. In this sense, even if there was an agreement about 
effectiveness measures for the mission packages or development goals in Estonia, the 
cost inputs, the budget chapters and articles, would still not be readily identifiable with 
them. 
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6. Criterion Six and the Budget Structure 
The budget design should make it possible to aggregate related expenditures 
whenever they occur in the MoD sphere of administration. 
The current line-item budget scores high at relating similar objects of expenditure 
to different organizational units and aggregating them on many levels of detail. For 
example, it is easy to summarize all personnel costs (Articles 10-29), costs for electricity, 
for the whole MoD sphere of administration, for the Army or for a unit within the Army. 
In this sense the budget satisfies the sixth criterion. This kind of classification facilitates 
the control over expenditures, for example, it makes sure that the same personnel posts 
are not paid too differently in different places and the organizations get a comparable 
share for maintaining their buildings of comparable size. 
However, if there is a need to relate all costs to carrying out the mission packages, 
such as training or the costs of ensuring a smooth transition from peace to war, there is 
currently no or little indication about how much money should come from which budget 
chapters and articles. The situation is similar to linking related expenditures with 
different development goals, for example, expenditures for developing two infantry 
brigades in operating budgets of individual units and in procurement and construction 
chapters of the budget, which are not readily identifiable. 
D.        CONCLUSION FOR CHAPTER V 
The  current  defense  budget  structure  is  based  on  line  items  (objects  of 
expenditure), not on the purpose of the expenditures. This budget format scores best at 
keeping control over expenditures and at ensuring that the money is spent only on these 
objects of expenditure that were allowed regardless of purpose of these objects. The 
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working hypothesis of the thesis was that the current defense budget structure does not 
support rational decision making. To prove this, the chapter discussed the criteria for 
rational decision making and related them to the Estonian case. In general, these criteria 
focused on the missions of the forces that should then guide resource allocation. Since 
Estonian military strategy was adopted only very recently, it would have been an 
unrealistic expectation to find that the missions of the strategy were linked to budget 
articles. However, the analysis showed how weak this connection currently is. The 
second part of the analysis focused on the linkage between the current budget and 
existing broad development goals. Also, in this case, the current budget structure scored 
poorly. In other words, the working hypothesis is proven. The way the current budget 
structures expenditures does not support rational decision making. 
Chapter II referred to some research findings, and confirmed that the way a 
budget is structured influences what the discussion will be in decision making and what 
kinds of decisions can be made. There are also some parallels with those findings in the 
Estonian case. The current budget is structured in accordance with the existing laws and 
regulations that focus on the control function of budgeting. The current budget structure 
scores well in control function. Effectiveness, or getting the most out of the budget to 
achieve the broad goals or carry out the missions of defense,- is not very important to the 
control function. As a result, this budget structure facilitates decisions based on the cost 
inputs and discourages decisions on the basis of achievement outputs or effectiveness. 
As the justification letters and explanations of spending that usually accompany 
the budget requests in the MoD's sphere of administration do not influence the budget 
structure, they were not summarized in Chapter IV. However, even these documents do 
91 
not generally link the budget requests with the broad missions or goals of development. 
Instead, they further specify the basic resource inputs, like the number of personnel posts 
on which the basis of the personnel costs are calculated or separate maintenance costs 
between buildings, or equipment types. Nowhere is there usually an explanation to which 
missions or goals these personnel posts or buildings contribute or why exactly the given 
numbers and types of personnel, and buildings are needed. Since these questions are not 
very important to the control function, they can be neglected if control is the only 
function of budgeting. 
On the other hand, if somebody wants to make more rational decisions that would 
allocate money among competing purposes and not budget articles on the basis of costs 
and effectiveness, and with regard to future implications of current financial 
commitments to future budget needs, the decision maker is helpless in the current array 
of expenditures because the budget for the most part does not satisfy these and other 
criteria for rational decision making identified in this chapter. 
Even if the budget structure does not support rational decision making, it does not 
necessarily follow that the goals and missions do not form the basis on which budget 
numbers are composed and no rational decisions will be made. However because there is 
no clear linkage between the expenditures and their purposes in the budget, the only 
obvious thing the ministerial/high military level decision makers can do with this budget 
is to compare the next year's budget with the last year's in an incremental mode and rely 
on their personal experience and hope that their subordinate organizations/units have 
done thorough a analysis regarding alternatives, costs and effectiveness and that the 
priorities of the subordinate organizations are the same as the priorities of the parent 
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organization. However, the U.S. case, before adopting the PPBS that was mentioned in 
Chapters II and III, where the military plans were composed without regards to the costs 
and the budgets were composed without regards to the plans, strongly suggests that if a 
budget does not satisfy the criteria for rational decision making, the missions, plans and 
budgets are not linked and planning may become irrelevant regardless of whether the 
costs are too high, too low or just right which is solely a matter of chance. 
Although the current budget receives high points on the control function, its 
structure does not support rational decision making. There are some caveats that soften 
this rather depressing conclusion. The first caveat is related to the political nature of 
decision making. The thesis generally did not consider this aspect other than referring to 
the proponents of incrementalism who appreciate the political flexibility of line items. By 
disregarding politics, then the current budget structure is completely irrational. In reality, 
however, this is an unrealistic assumption. Another caveat refers to the complexity. A 
budget structure that does support rational decision making could be so immensely 
complex that it would suffocate the whole budget process, as was mentioned several 
times in Chapter II. If the decision makers and analysts do not have enough time and 
mental energy to act even in the name of limited rationality as identified in Chapter II, 
making decisions by using (irrational) line-item budgets, together with incremental 
budgeting, may still be a better option than making no decisions at all under rational 
budgeting if the participants run out of time by trying to reach a comprehensive 
agreement   and   understanding   alternatives,   purposes,   costs,   benefits   and   their 
interrelationships.  The potentially immense complexity and the political nature of 
decision making would probably mean, that in the real world, there would never be a 
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budget structure that would completely satisfy rational decision making in the sense of 
the criteria used in the analysis, especially if the budget is designed primarily for the 
purposes of control and operates in an political environment. However, if there were, 
such a budget structure would probably be very unstable, because every time there is a 
change in policy or environment, the budget structure should also change, and this seems 
to make it unrealistic, because setting up a budget structure is a lengthy process. 
However, the next chapter proposes some ways to structure budgetary 
information for internal decision-making purposes in the MoD's sphere of administration 
that would score better at satisfying the analytic criteria used in this chapter. 
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VI.    RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter identified the shortcomings of the current budget structure 
regarding whether it supports rational decision making in MoD/high military levels of 
command. The purpose of this chapter is to propose some alternative ways to structure 
budgetary information that could theoretically help in making better rational decisions 
and to discuss their strengths and weaknesses. 
Although the current line item budget scores poorly at satisfying the criteria for 
rational decision making, there is little hope of completely giving up this format. Its 
simplicity, stability over time and universal applicability to all ministries and other state 
institutions, makes it a desirable format for the Ministry of Finance since it must compare 
the expenses of all major state institutions regardless of the purposes they serve. The 
function of control that the current budget format supports is also an extremely important 
function of the state, including the MoD itself. Therefore, it is unlikely that the existing 
laws and regulations requiring the usage of a line-item budget will be changed. As the 
MoD has to comply with the existing laws and regulations, the line-item budget is here to 
stay. 
That being said, does it mean that the MoD must give up attempts to have a better 
budget format for internal decision making in its sphere of administration? Absolutely 
not! Chapter II identified the possibility that several budget formats may coexist at the 
same time given that the rules on how to crosswalk one budget format into another have 
been specified. Chapters II and III also identified that the format of a program budget or 
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programming, with the possible inclusion of ZBB elements, is the most suitable for 
making rational decisions at the top level of organizations. Taking this into consideration, 
the challenge of developing a budget format for rational decision making translates into 
developing a good program structure and linking the line items, such as the budget 
chapters and articles, with the programs. 
B.        SELECTING THE PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
Chapter II identified a broad guideline on how to define a program. A program is 
a broad objective consisting of elements with similar functions, which compete with each 
other for funding from the program. Chapter III identified that a program should produce 
end products rather than objects or intermediate products, although the distinction is often 
ambiguous and depends on the perspective. Similarly as in Chapter III, if it is assumed 
that the end product of defense is the security of the nation, then it is correct, but too 
general for analytic purposes. Therefore, this broad purpose must be further translated 
into meaningful elements. There are different ways to do that. The next sections present 
alternative ways for linking the budget with its intended outputs and assesses their 
strengths and weaknesses. 
1. The First Alternative: Programs Based on Wartime Forces 
This alternative assumes that the wartime forces, such as the units formed on the 
basis of both peacetime units and the mobilized reserves, are the end outputs of the 
defense budget. In this case, different wartime units or their groups would be labeled as 
programs. In Estonia, developing two infantry brigades, the territorial defense forces and 
augmentation forces would then be the major programs of the Army, air surveillance, 
rapid reaction forces and air defense the major programs of the Air Force and Mine 
Warfare the major program of the Navy. If more forces would be developed in the future 
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and developing the above mentioned units was only the mid-term goal and not a goal for 
the indefinite future, they would simply be defined as new programs. 
Linking the budget chapters and articles with these programs would then require 
identifying how much the existing peacetime units contribute to these programs and, as 
the next step, allocating the budgets of peacetime units and other expenses to these 
programs according to some rules of thumb. An example of how this could be done is 
given next. 
Program 1: First Infantry Brigade 
Program element: Second Infantry Reserve Battalion 
Who: Second Training Battalion of the Army (a peacetime unit that trains 
personnel for this wartime unit), other peacetime units that have a role here. 
The costs incurred by all peacetime units having a role in preparing this battalion 
would be presented in the budget tables described next. These tables would then 
summarize all costs, direct and indirect, that are incurred directly in the peacetime units 
to prepare this wartime battalion as a program element of Program 1 or are allocated to 
this program according to some rules of thumb: 
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From the operating budget of FY2001 FY2002 FY200X 
a peacetime training unit (i.e. future year) 
10 Personnel Costs 
21 Social Tax XXX XXX XXX 
22... XXX XXX XXX 
26 Aids XXX XXX XXX 
27 Compensations 
















costs could be 
allocated on the 
basis of a "fair 
1    share". 
Table 1. Costs from Operating Budgets of a Peacetime Unit (Second Infantry 
Reserve Battalion, Program 1). 
If a peacetime unit has a role in several programs at the same time, then its budget 
would be allocated among all those programs. Table 1 covers only one program element 
of the first program. Similar tables would be prepared for peacetime units other than for 
training if they have a role in this program, but they are not presented here. Different 
alternatives, for example, different ways to prepare this wartime unit, could be prepared 
here that would then compete for funding. This alternative that scores best could then get 
funded given the available capacity in the winning peacetime units that contribute to the 
winning program. Regarding training, different alternatives could be prepared, such as 
what skills are taught and length of training. 
98 
Special Equipment and 
Military Clothing 
for training 
FY2001 FY2002 FY200X 
Chapter 91 Special 
Equipment and Military 
Clothing 
46x Ammunition 











from Chapter 91 
that are incurred by 
providing training 
to this wartime unit 
or are allocated by 
some rules of 
thumb 
Table 2. Special Equipment and Military Clothing for Training (Second Infantry 
Reserve Battalion, Program 1). 
Table 2 would then summarize costs from Chapter 91 of the defense budget that 
would be incurred for training in this program or program element. 
Special Equipment and Military 
Clothing for Mobilization Reserve 
46x Ammunition 
46x Military Clothing 
46x... 
FY2001 FY2002 FY200X 
These articles would 
summarize these 
expenditures from 




for this wartime unit 
Table 3. Special Equipment and Military Clothing for Mobilization Reserve 
(Second Infantry Reserve Battalion, Program 1). 
Obviously, a wartime unit is not complete if it is trained, but not equipped. Table 
3 summarizes the costs for procurement of these supplies. 
Investments for Second 
Infantry Reserve Battalion 
FY2001 FY2002 FY200X 
Chapter 97 Investments 
73 Capital Repairs 
73x 
76 Procurement of 
Immovables 
76x Construction of the 
Mobilization Depot 
77 Procurement of Movables 
77x Transportation vehicles 






from Chapter 97 
that are incurred 




directly or are 
allocated to it 
according to 
some rules of 
thumb 
Other costs for Developing This 
Wartime Unit 
37 Information Technology 
37x 
FY2001 FY2002 FY200X 
Table 5. Other Costs (Second Infantry Reserve Battalion, Program 1). 
Procurement alternatives could be presented for each type of major equipment, 
object of infrastructure and supplies like ammunition. Their life-cycle costs would be 
presented in, and allocated among, these wartime units (^programs) to whose 
development they are contributing. 
The existing budget articles identify only the type of budget inputs such as 
salaries or maintenance costs regardless of their purposes. The new program format 
would take the existing articles like salaries, fuel and maintenance costs and scatter them 
among the programs or even program elements, for example, purposes. To keep track of 
these changes and to allow for showing the linkages between line items and programs, 
giving additional codes to the already existing budget articles would be advisable. For 
example, all personnel cost articles that are allocated to the Program 1 (1st Infantry 
Brigade) could be designated as follows: 
Current Budget Articles Proposed Budget Articles 
10 Salaries and Wages 
11 Salaries of Public Servants 
111 Base Salary 
10-139 Salaries and Wages of Program 1 
11-1 Salaries of Public Servants for Program 1 
111-1 Base Salary for Program 1 
Table 6. An example of the New Codes for Current Budget Articles. 
39 The new codes would not just add more digits to the existing ones, but also separate the old and new 
code parts with a "-". This would facilitate the recognition of which articles are necessary to comply with 
the existing regulations and which are not, and ensures that the old and new article codes would not 
interfere with each other. For example, adding one more digit to the already existing article 11 Salaries of 
Public Servants for Program 1 (i.e. 111) would confuse it with an already existing article 111 Base Salary. 
11-1 Salaries and Wages for Program 1 would be the correct code. 
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Those parts of the current budget articles or chapters that belong to other 
programs would receive similar codes like 10-2 Salaries and Wages for Program 2. Using 
these codes, the costs of different programs can be aggregated at the desired level of 
detail and wherever incurred in the administrative structure. Separate codes could be 
developed for every program or also for every program element although the latter would 
make the classification very complex. 
There are a number of organizations and budget chapters that are not directly 
related to the preparation of any wartime military units, yet their costs would also have to 
be allocated to the wartime units, if the latter are considered as the only end use outputs 
of the defense budget. An example of such organizations would be the MoD, Military 
Educational Institutions, Central Depots, Defense attaches etc. Their costs could also be 
allocated to the Other Costs (Table 5). 
In form of concrete steps or rules, the process of creating this type of a budget 
could be summarized with the following steps: 
Identifying the wartime units as budget outputs and labeling them or their 
groups as programs 
Identifying how much the peacetime units contribute to the preparation of 
wartime units 
On the basis of their contribution to programs, allocating the budgets of 
peacetime units among the programs 
Identifying costs outside of the budgets of peacetime units 
Identifying how much these costs contribute to different programs 
On the basis of contribution, allocating these other costs among the 
programs 
Preparing alternatives and identifying their costs and contribution 
Selecting the best alternative for every program and translating their costs 
into conventional budget format for the Ministry of Finance. 
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Such classification could formally satisfy the most important criteria for rational 
decision making. By projecting the budget several years ahead, the total costs of a 
program could be assessed as well as future cost implications of current decisions. 
Different peacetime units could compete for funding by presenting their budget proposal 
for the given objective: developing wartime units. This means there would be 
alternatives. Besides, making tradeoffs between developing an infantry brigade and air 
surveillance or between air surveillance and territorial forces would be much more 
meaningful than making tradeoffs between salaries and insurance costs or between 
maintenance costs of vehicles and new construction. The wartime forces would represent 
achievement outputs and the budget articles the resource inputs, between which then a 
cost - effectiveness analysis could be carried out. In this sense, such a general program 
structure would theoretically satisfy the abstract criteria for rational decision making as 
identified in Chapter II. Yet, such a program structure also has two serious shortfalls. 
First, it assumes that the wartime forces are the only outputs of the defense budget 
and their development is the only mission of the strategy that would neglect a wide range 
of other missions40. This is a serious problem for alternative one as it would not satisfy 
the specified version of Chapter II criteria as identified in Chapter V. 
The second problem is related to the practical implementation of such a program 
structure. The aforementioned example did not yet specify all the costs for one program: 
developing a wartime infantry brigade. Yet even this small incomplete example shows 
the  extreme  complexity of this approach  and its  dependability on a number  of 
40 Technically, developing forces is not a mission at all, but rather a response to the missions. 
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assumptions. For example, the budgets of the existing training units have to be allocated 
among different programs, mainly training personnel for different wartime units. This 
would be the first and relatively easy step, if it were known in advance how many 
personnel this training unit has to train in a given year, to which wartime units these 
people will be assigned, and if the number of personnel trained is the main cost driver of 
the budgets of the training units. The problem is that although the training units could 
know the number of personnel they have to train, the other assumptions are often likely to 
be unrealistic. Currently the training units can also train personnel who are not yet 
assigned to a particular wartime unit. Although the operating budget of the training units 
depends also on the number of personnel trained, a number of costs, especially of 
maintenance, would be incurred regardless whether the unit is training one or five 
hundred personnel in a year. Finding an adequate rate for allocating these maintenance 
costs among different programs would be very difficult. 
Allocating some other, mainly direct costs, outside of the operating budgets of 
training units, for example, costs for ammunition or clothing and procurement costs for 
mobilization reserves, to wartime units could theoretically also be relatively easy. 
However, this is true only if it is known in advance for which exact programs or wartime 
units the procurement is made. This may or may not be the case. If it is not, then the 
resources   cannot   be   allocated.   Furthermore,   there   are   a  number  of peacetime 
organizational units in defense that are not directly involved in developing any wartime 
units, but may still have important functions. Examples could be the MoD, Military 
Educational Institutions, Central Depots and military orchestra. If the wartime units are 
the only outputs of the defense budget, they must carry a huge number of allocated costs 
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from all such organizations that have little or nothing in common. Figuring out the 
correct allocation rate and doing such allocations would also be an extremely difficult 
exercise. To overcome the aforementioned problems, an alternative program structure is 
offered next. 
2.        The Second Alternative: Programs Based on Missions of the Strategy- 
a Detailed Approach 
The central assumption of this alternative is that carrying out the missions of the 
strategy is the final output of the defense budget. The missions of the EDF were grouped 
into packages in Chapter IV and these packages were also used in the analysis in Chapter 
V. The next logical step would then be defining these packages as programs, developing 
specific output measures for these packages, and allocating the defense budget, both the 
operating budget of peacetime units and other parts of the defense budget, among 
programs on the basis of those output measures. This alternative follows a rather 
orthodox approach that would go into deep levels of detail in separating all costs between 
packages. If an expenditure like maintenance costs of buildings, wherever occurred, has 
even a slightest role in contributing to some output measures, then it must be allocated 
among all of them. 
The next section gives a list of which peacetime units could contribute to different 
programs and suggests some output measures. Since there are no official guidelines about 
how to do this, the following classification is purely the judgment of the researcher. 
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Program 1: Training and Education 
Possible output measures: number of personnel or units trained/educated, 
or trained/educated personnel who pass the subsequent tests. 
Contributors: 
Military Educational Institutions, including BALTDEFCOL (its main mission) 
Six infantry training battalions (their main mission) 
Air Defense Training Battalion (its main mission) 
Defense League field units (their main mission) 
Other field units from all services (their secondary mission) 
National Defense Departments (secondary mission: calling conscripts and reserve into service 
for training)  
Program 2: Readiness 
Possible output measure: number of days to achieve the predetermined level of readiness 
Contributors: 
BALTBAT (its main mission) 
Air Force rapid reaction capability (main mission) 
All other units, i.e. keeping them at certain readiness levels (their secondary mission) 
Program 3: Alliances and partnerships 
Possible output measures: predetermined capacity to participate in peace operations and 
international exercises, predetermined host nation support (FINS) capabilities (e.g. number and 
types of allied aircraft/ships to which HNS can be offered) 
Contributors: 
Peace Operations Center (its main mission) 
Defense attaches (not in the strategy, but a convenient place to put this money) 
Estonian representatives to NATO (not in the strategy, but a convenient place to put this 
money) 
BALTRON (some role) 
BALTNET (some role) 
Airbase (for host nation support) 
Naval base (for host nation support) 
In the sense of participating in international operations, all military units and organizations of 
MoD have a role 
Program 4: Mobilization and Deployment 
Possible output measure: days needed to mobilize and deploy 
Contributors: 
National Defense Departments (main mission) 
All other units have a role in this package 
Program 5: Wartime operations 
Possible output measures: availability of supplies (in terms of days) like of ammunition, of fuel 
etc., given a particular scenario. From a more war fighting side: response time to foreign 
provocations. 
Contributors: No peacetime military unit is directly connected with this program, but this is the 
main mission of all wartime units. Because the funds for peacetime operations and for 
mobilization/deployment are already included into other programs, the financial side of this 
program would in the most part consist only of funds for procurement and maintenance of 
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wartime reserve materials like ammunition, fuel and their storage (especially construction and 
O&M costs of mobilization depots) to avoid double counting of funds. The nonfinancial 
description of the program could add additional information about the purpose and conduct of 
operations and other measures like response time to foreign provocations, type and extent of 
operations the forces are capable of conducting, types and quantities of forces provided etc. 
Program 6: Defense Support to Civil Authorities 
Possible output measure: number of units capable of this kind of support, predetermined support 
capacity 
Contributors: Many units funded from the defense budget could contribute to this program, but 
it would always be their auxiliary mission. 
Program 7: Monitoring and Control over Airspace and Territorial Waters 
Possible output measures: area coverage, predetermined capacity to intercept violators, for 
BALTRON: capability to clean/lay sea mines. 
Contributors: 
BALTNET (main mission) 
BALTRON (main mission) 
Other naval and air force units as contributors 
Table 7. Description of Programs. 
There are a number of other organizational units in the MoD's sphere of 
administration that could not even remotely be identified with any particular program, 
mainly in the field of command and support like the MoD itself, the General (Joint) Staff, 
the service staffs, the central depots and other support units such as the military orchestra. 
The orthodox allocation rules would require allocating their budgets among the existing 
programs, because the programs should cover all missions and all funds. Yet this would 
only add to the complexities and the allocation rates would be extremely difficult to 
determine.  It would also almost certainly not offer better decisions, because the 
expenditures of these organizational units for the most part do not vary with any activity 
in the programs. Allocating their budgets among the existing programs could create the 
illusion that, for example, if a decision is made to reduce the host nation support 
capability or the number of units trained, then the budgets of the MoD, General (Joint) 
Staff and of other units in that list could also be reduced on the grounds of diminished 
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workload. Therefore a better idea would be to create a new resource program for them 
rather than allocating their costs among all programs. This additional program is the "all 
other" category that has no direct link with the missions, but would still be necessary for 
almost everything and include then the rest of the still unallocated funds. It could be 
called "General Command and Support" (Program 8). 
After identifying the relationships between the programs and their contributors, 
the next step would be determining the extent to which different organizational units 
contribute to different programs. On the basis of such an analysis, the broad allocation 
rules would be developed and the operating budgets of all organizations would then be 
allocated among the programs. 
The final step would then associate the budget chapters and articles outside of the 
operating budgets of the units with the programs. 
A similar crosswalk explained under the first alternative by dividing the existing 
budget articles between programs and assigning them special codes would show the 
relationships between conventional budgets or budget articles and the programs. The 
difference between the previous and current alternatives is that the new article codes here 
would be based on the mission packages or the programs in this alternative, rather than 
on wartime units of the previous alternative. In summary, this alternative could be 
described with the following steps: 
• Identifying the missions of the strategy 
• Grouping them into meaningful packages, calling them programs and 
defining the output measures for every program (Programs 1 -7) 
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• Identifying the individual units that contribute directly to one or several 
programs (Programs 1-7). The output measures defined in Step 2 
determine contribution 
• On the basis of contribution, allocating the budgets of these units among 
Programs 1-7 
• Identifying the remaining units that have no direct relationship with the 
abovementioned mission-based programs and establishing the "all other" 
program for them 
• Allocating the budgets of these units to the "all other" category 
• Identifying the costs outside the budgets of units that can be directly 
associated with one or several program and allocating these costs to the 
respective programs 
• Identifying all remaining costs and allocating them to the "all other" 
category. 
• Preparing alternatives for different programs 
• Selecting the best alternatives for every program 
This crosswalk would also satisfy the criteria for rational decision making. Given 
that a sufficient timeframe is selected, it should be possible to see the total cost of a 
program with reasonable limits, of course. The budget chapters and articles would be 
linked with the output measurements through programs. This would facilitate the cost- 
effectiveness analysis, given that an agreement is reached about the relative importance 
of a particular program with comparison to its costs. Due to the multi-year perspective, 
the future cost implications of current decisions can be presented4i. The programs 
themselves would also be much better alternatives than separate budget chapters or 
articles. A compromise between training volume and peacekeeping capability or between 
airspace control and capability to assist civilian authorities would be much more 
meaningful than compromises between salaries and maintenance costs of buildings or 
41 Of course, this format allows the showing of the future cost implications of current decisions, but by 
itself, it does not calculate or predetermine what these implications are. If they are uncertain, then putting 
these costs into this framework will not make them more or less certain. 
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between procurement of ammunition and maintenance costs of vehicles or social tax. The 
compromises between different programs would be horizontal between different output 
types. There could also be vertical compromises in the spirit of ZBB, for example, when 
the alternatives show how much extra money would be needed to train one more unit, 
educate one more class of, say 30 officers or participate in one more international 
exercise. Finally, the programs would summarize the costs incurred for similar purposes 
regardless of where they are incurred. 
As a result, this alternative budget presentation would also technically satisfy the 
criteria for rational decision making. It would also score better on the points that the 
previous alternative did not. The current alternative considers all major missions of the 
strategy, not just developing wartime forces, which is technically not even a mission in 
itself, but rather the response to the missions. However, this budget structure has the 
same serious shortfall as the previous one. Its complexity and ambiguity makes the 
implementation unlikely even after putting the command and support units into the "all 
other" program. There would be a huge problem on how to allocate the operating budgets 
of an existing unit if the same unit is contributing to several programs at the same time in 
the situation where a large portion of its budget is just needed to keep this unit intact 
regardless of what it does, especially for costs related to general maintenance. Therefore, 
even if the second alternative is better than the first, it must be simplified. This is done in 
the third alternative that is presented next. 
3. The Third Alternative: Programs Based on Missions of the Strategy- a 
Simplified Approach 
The  most  important  difference  between  this  alternative  and  the  previous 
alternative rests on the assumption that most organizations have one major mission or 
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function,  although they may also contribute to several other missions. This then 
determines all other differences between alternatives two and three. In this context the 
major mission would be a particular program and other missions would be other 
programs. After identifying the major program of an organization, this alternative then 
identifies all costs of this organization that are needed for just keeping it intact, but idle, 
and allocates them to the major program of the organization or unit42. These costs could 
be called basic maintenance costs43. The assumption behind this approach is that if the 
major program of an organization did not exist, there would be little need to preserve this 
organization. Although this would not be absolutely correct, and there would be several 
programs that would not have even a single unit of their "own", this approach would 
significantly reduce the complexities of cost allocation among programs.  This  is 
important, because otherwise, the complexities would probably suffocate the system as 
often happened with the efforts to introduce ZBB or PPBS as was identified in Chapter II. 
After allocating these basic maintenance costs of a unit to its major program, all other 
costs are allocated on the basis of actual contribution to different programs. In practice, 
however, most of the operating budgets of the units would be allocated to their major 
42 In contrast, alternative two does not make such a distinction, but allocates all costs incurred in 
individual units on the basis of the determined contribution (output) measures. Alternative three excludes 
the aforementioned costs from the pool of costs that are allocated on a basis of actual contribution, and 
allocates these basic maintenance costs of a unit directly to its major program regardless of those 
contribution measures. Only in the next step, will the remaining costs be allocated on the basis of actual 
contributions. 
43 The basic maintenance costs would not necessarily be equal with maintenance costs in the sense of 
Article 30, because this article includes all maintenance costs that are incurred regardless whether they are 
incurred in everyday activities or by keeping the units intact, but idle. For example, article 30 includes the 
maintenance costs of vehicle repairs in the units (or organizations) that are needed for all vehicle repairs, 
whereas most of them would not be incurred if the units did not operate. The basic maintenance costs could 
also include costs outside of the operating budgets of units like costs for infrastructure repairs or 
construction, if these costs are necessary to preserve the unit. In practice, detailed rules must be created and 
negotiated that would be sufficient for the accountants/budgeters for their everyday work. 
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program. This is because the basic maintenance costs of a unit plus direct costs associated 
with its actual contribution to its major program usually comprises the bulk of its budget. 
For example, for Program 1 (Training and Education), there are two major groups 
of units that would have their major mission here: the training battalions of the Army and 
the Military Educational Institutions. Therefore, their basic maintenance costs would be 
allocated to Program 1. Then other costs that are usually directly or indirectly associated 
with training or education would then also be allocated to Program 1 as the next step. An 
example of direct training costs would be the costs of catering. An example of indirect 
training costs would be the salaries of instructors, or transportation costs that are incurred 
by training. These training costs could be avoided if no training took place, but they do 
not generally vary much with the number of people trained. An example of a basic 
maintenance cost of training units would be the maintenance of vehicles, and maybe of 
buildings that are not directly used by training, but are still necessary to keep the unit 
running. In other words, the costs of construction or maintenance in the sense of Article 
30 would normally not be included in the training costs, because they are already 
included in the basic maintenance costs, because most of the buildings must be 
maintained irrespective of what the people are doing inside them. At the same time, 
although this would not be their main mission, the training units and institutions also 
contribute to other programs: they must be kept at a predetermined level of readiness 
(Program 2), they have a role in mobilization (Program 4) and in war (Program 5) and 
eventually, they could assist civil authorities (Program 6). If some extra resources were 
needed in training/educational organizations to contribute to these programs, then these 
and only these funds would be allocated to other programs. Clearly, the volume of these 
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funds is relatively limited. If the same weapon or vehicle that is necessary for 
contributing to these additional programs is also usually used in everyday training, its 
cost will be included in Program 1 and not in some other program. However, if the total 
number of weapons, vehicles, buildings or the total amount of fuel that is associated with 
a particular unit must be kept at the level above of the needs of Program 1, then these 
additional funds would be allocated to the other programs. 
For Program 2 (Readiness) there are currently only a few units that have readiness 
as their main mission: the BALTBAT and the rapid reaction capability of the Air Force. 
Their basic maintenance costs would then be assigned to this program. Obviously, the 
same units also have a role in mobilization, in war, in international operations and 
elsewhere, but only the incremental costs in BALTBAT and the Air Force needed to 
contribute to other program would then be allocated to other programs. 
Considering other examples, Program 4 (Mobilization and Deployment) has only 
the National Defense Departments as its major units, although even here one could argue 
that the main mission of these organizations would be assisting in the training of 
conscripts and reservists. At the same time, mobilization is a very essential mission for all 
units, but most of the their budgets would still be allocated to other programs. 
Nevertheless, the program could describe how all units are planning to carry out their 
roles in mobilization, even if most of their budgets would be allocated to other programs 
to avoid the double counting of funds44. 
44 This is just another example that illustrates how the requirements identified in Chapter III, that 
programs should be collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive, and set some limits on how the actual 
resource allocations can be made among programs. 
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Some programs, Program 5 (Wartime Operations) and Program 6 (Defense 
Support to Civil Authorities), are unique in the sense that they have no "own" units 
financed from the defense budget45 and consequently they do not have any basic 
maintenance cost of peacetime units allocated to them. Therefore, the financial volume of 
these programs could be theoretically more limited than most of the other programs. 
However, given that huge wartime reserves may be needed that have no use in peacetime, 
the fifth program could include funds for their procurement and maintenance. This could 
mean that substantial funds are included in Program 5, for example, if some mobilization 
depots are built then the costs of their construction and subsequent maintenance would be 
included here. For the most part, this program would thus include funds outside of the 
operating budgets of the organizational entities (units), as the funds of the operating 
budgets of peacetime units are already included elsewhere. Similarly for the second 
alternative, the nonfinancial description of the contribution of units to this program would 
then include some more warfighting measures, not just logistical or supply measures that 
can be directly associated with resources. 
Generally, similar steps used to summarize the previous alternative could 
characterize the third alternative, because this alternative is just the modified version of 
the second. Its steps would include: 
• Identifying the missions of the strategy 
• Grouping them into meaningful packages, calling them programs and 
defining the output measures for every program (Programs 1-7) 
45 In the case of Program 6, the rescue operations are the main mission of the Rescue Service that 
obtain funding from the budget of the Ministry of Interior's Sphere of Administration. 
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• Identifying the individual units that contribute directly to one or several 
programs (Programs 1-7). The output measures defined in Step 2 
determine contribution 
• Identifying the major program for each unit mentioned in Step 3 
• Identifying the basic maintenance costs in each organizational unit and 
allocating them to their major programs 
• Identifying costs other than basic maintenance costs in the budgets of the 
units mentioned in Step 3 and determining their relationships with 
Programs 1-7 
• On the basis of contributions to Programs 1-7, allocating all these costs 
among these programs 
• Identifying costs outside the operating budgets of the units mentioned in 
Step 3 that are directly related to Programs 1-7 
• Allocating those costs to the programs on the basis of contributions 
• Identifying the remaining units, that have no clear linkage with Programs 
1-7 
• Identifying their costs, both inside and outside of their operating budgets 
and allocating these costs to the "all other" category, the Program 8 
(General Command and Support) until they can be classified into more 
meaningful categories 
• Preparing alternatives for different programs 
• Selecting the best alternative for every program 
Since alternative three is just a simplified version of the previous one, it has 
similar advantages and disadvantages. However, it is simpler to do, because there is no 
need to allocate the basic maintenance costs among different programs which would be 
very arbitrary. Therefore, this is the best of the three alternatives for linking the budget 
with the missions. 
The disadvantage of complexity and ambiguity of the previous alternative is 
reduced, but even after taking this into consideration, it is still much more difficult to do 
than the current budgeting practice where all salaries, maintenance costs, costs for 
procurement and other line items are simply collected together and presented as a budget 
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proposal. It also requires clear operational instructions about what goes into basic 
maintenance costs and what does not. Another complexity arises from the need to define 
clear rules for measuring the contribution of different units to different programs 
necessary for resource allocation. These questions do not arise by only using the 
traditional line item budgets, because the traditional budget simply ignores them. In this 
sense, even this simpler alternative may become too complex to be implemented in 
reality. 
Yet if successful, this kind of budget classification would significantly facilitate 
rational decision making at the top of the Estonian defense establishment by offering a 
much better linkage between the missions and the budget resources; a linkage that is 
currently missing in the budget. 
C.       CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER VI 
The   chapter   discussed  three   alternative   ways   to   structure  the   budgetary 
information in a way that would support rational decision making by implementing the 
missions of the strategy and broad goals of development. It found that although all of 
these alternatives would theoretically satisfy the criteria for rational decision making, the 
third alternative would be the best of them, because it focuses on all missions, not just 
forces and is also less complex and less arbitrary than the previous alternatives. However 
the chapter concluded that structuring budgetary information according to the relative 
simple and clear rules of the third alternative, as compared to the other alternatives, 
would still be much more complex and therefore more difficult to do than using the rules 
of the currently used line item budgeting. If this programming is done and used by a 
handful of analysts alone, it will probably disappear soon regardless how useful or 
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useless it is. To give this approach a chance of survival, its format should become the 
basis on which the ministerial planning guidance and other planning documents 
mentioned in Chapter IV will be composed in the future. 
The last chapter gives concluding remarks and suggests some areas for further 
research that must be done before any of these alternatives could be implemented in 
practice. 
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VII.   CONCLUSION 
A.       PROBLEM SUMMARY 
The first chapters of the thesis discussed the linkage between budgeting, budget 
structure and decision making and identified the abstract criteria a budget structure 
should meet to support rational decision making. The thesis discussed different budgeting 
approaches and the budget formats these approaches used. As a result of the discussion, a 
mission-based program budget format emerged as the most suitable budget format for 
making rational decisions. 
The next chapter summarized the current planning and budgeting framework of 
the Estonian defense. In particular, they focused on the missions of the Armed Forces as 
defined by the recently adopted Estonian military strategy and on the current defense 
budget structure. Then, the thesis discussed the abstract criteria of rational decision 
making and if they were relevant for the Estonian case. Their content was further 
specified for Estonia. 
The subsequent analysis of the Estonian budget structure yielded two major 
results: one positive and one negative. On the positive side, the current budget is good at 
fulfilling one major function of budgeting: control. The control function focuses on 
ensuring that the funds are spent only on those objects of expenditure that were allowed 
by the Parliament regardless of their purposes and that the limits established in the budget 
accounts are not overspent. These functions are important for preventing fraud and 
ensuring the solvency of the state. However, on the negative side, the current budget 
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structure scored poorly at supporting rational decision making as specified by the selected 
criteria. 
B.        SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Taking the results of the analysis into account, the thesis discussed three 
alternatives of structuring budgetary information, each of which would score better at 
satisfying the criteria mentioned above. None of them prescribed abandoning the current 
line item budget, but rather proposed adding another layer of budget formats to the 
already existing line items. This additional layer establishes the crosswalk between 
budget inputs and outputs (purposes), but because the old budget format would also be 
maintained, it would not violate existing laws and regulations. The first alternative, the 
program structure based on the planned or existing wartime force structures alone did not 
find adequate support, because this structure would ignore a number of missions of the 
strategy and its extreme complexity and arbitrary allocation rules would make it very 
difficult to implement. The second alternative addressed the first problem by proposing a 
program budget based on all major mission types, but it still had the problems of 
ambiguity and complexity. Finally the third alternative, a somewhat simplified 
modification of the second alternative, emerged as the superior option of the three 
alternatives. However, even this simplified alternative would be more complex than the 
current budget that is based only on line items. 
C.        SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The thesis touched the political nature of decision making in several places, but it 
did not specifically address this issue for analytic clarity and for the need to keep the 
topic manageable. However, the decision making in the real world is likely to be at least 
as political as it is analytical. Therefore, even if the discussed modifications to the current 
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budget structure, including the recommended third alternative in Chapter VI, satisfy the 
analytic criteria for rationality, its implementation may not be advisable if it does not 
allow political irrationality or political rationality to operate. Therefore, further research 
is advisable to test whether the proposed changes can survive in a political environment. 
There is a second area that needs further research: the implications the proposed 
changes have on the current accounting system in Estonian defense. If the accounting 
system does not support the proposed changes then they do not make much sense. In this 
case the existing system has to be modified or the changes abandoned. In particular, the 
thesis proposed splitting the existing budget articles among programs and creating new 
codes for them. This means more work for budgeters/accountants and potentially lengthy 
discussions between them and the decision makers and planners before the proposed 
changes can be defined on the level of detail where the budgeters/accountants have clear 
instructions for their detailed work. The existing procedures and accounting software, 
may need modification and new skills may have to be developed for example, how to 
split a budget article between basic maintenance costs and costs specifically attributable 
to programs. All this requires time and money and the costs of making these changes 
have to be compared with the expected benefits so that the decision makers in MoD, but 
also in the General (Joint) Staff, would have a comprehensive picture before making a 
decision about possible implementation of the proposed changes. 
Going further, some research could be conducted to identify additional incentives, 
other than facilitating rational decision making, for implementing the changes. For 
example, if the proposed changes would allow presenting the financial needs of the 
defense in a more defensible format for the MoD in its "battle" for its share of the state 
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budget, it would give a strong incentive to implement these changes. Research should 
also investigate whether the recommended third alternative could further be simplified to 
decrease its complexity and hence costs for its implementation without losing its focus. 
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APPENDIX A. AN EXAMPLE OF A ZERO-BASED BUDGET 
FORMAT 









ADAM AND BAKER TEAM POLICING 
Budget Unit Gosl:lo protect life and 
property, prevent crime, respond to all calls 
for service from citizens, enlorce City 
ordinances. State and Federal laws, 
investigate and follow-up assigned cases 
and improve response time. 
Year 1978 
Budget (000): 4.335.1 millions of $ 
Positions: 292 
1979 Service level options 
Co« (000> OepL Gly 
No. S/L Cum. S/L Cum rank rink 
i. »878 A 3,e:» B 503 w; 1/M n 
7- 33« 9 •*,!'• 5.S se 290 3/eo T 
3 713 4.54;.? 3 293 18/BO 14» 
4. UM 4.39V« 18 310 37.'ft0 PSP 
5 :«-* 4.SW0 <a 325 4V60 3*3 
Service level narrative 
1. Quality Reduction and he/eased Citizen 
Risk, Provides service to the citizens in 
emergency situatk>ns and the officers 
would respond to cases of a less serious 
nature. Response time wi8 average 12 
minutes per cail. This level calls for 256 
commissioned officers. 6 civJians. 66 
marked (blue and white) vehicles, end 27 
unmarked vehicles. These officers 
provide 24-hour police service to the 
citizenry. Investigative foflow-up and 
crime scene processing is curtailed. 
2. Minimum Preventative Patrol. Provides 
twenty-seven commissioned officers 
and one clerk typist, who are neoded to 
provide beat officers to answer citizen 
request calls with a 2 minute per call 
reduction in the response time from 12 
minutes to 10 minutes. 
3. Interaction with USD #259. Provides for 
the reinstatement of two school liasion 
police officers who coordinate 
programs in the schools in two of the 
team policing areas. At this level, a 
school liason officer will be available in 
each of the sbc team policing areas. 
4. Adds Eighteen Police Officers to Reduce 
Response Time. Adds eighteen police 
officers Jo provide coverage in the 
patrol function for vacations, 
emergency leave, in-service training. 
and back-up officers. At this level, 
response time for calls win be reduced 
from 10 minutes to 9 minutes per cail. 
Positions are funded effective 1 April 
1979 (9 months). Costs include 
$136,049 for salaries and $12,818 for 
initial uniforms and equipment 
5. Improved Supervision and investigation. 
Adds six detectives to insure more 
foltow-up investigations, to accelerate 
the investigation process, and to 
improve clearance percentage: and si» 
lieutenants to provide quality control 
through supervision and shortened 
span of control. 
"ESSSiäES ZZ^E^ESS ■^-.■■act^^viv.-w^.y^' ■^^<»^^i^;y^,3iWT*^r««^'^y^,^^,^i,Jj',ii-vV>^^r.»'^X*^-" 
Note: S/L-Service level 
Cum-Cumulativo (including service levels below the line) 
Dept. rank -Department head's rank of the service package/total number of service packages in the Police Services 
Department (at decision units combined) 
City rank -Executive's rank of the service package out of all service packages forwarded by at City departments for.their 
service units 
PSP-Postponed; not ranked 
Source: Adapted from Richard Aronson ard Ei Schwartz, Management Policies in ioca/ Government Fm&nce, 2nd Ed. Washington, D.C.: 
International City Management Association, figure 5-10, P 112. 
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APPENDIX B. LINE ITEM BUDGET FORMATS 
1. Summary Format 
City of St Petersburg, Florida 
These definitions _ 
allow the reader to 
quickly identify types 
of expenditures 
presented in the table 
above without having 
to refer to a glossary. 
T- 
ALL OPERATING FUNDS 
SUMMARY OF EXPENSE BY OBJECT 
($000 omitted) 
Actual Actual Budget Estimate ^Budget 
1990 1991 1992 1992 i?4993>-. 
Personal Services 72,300 77,220 79,160 79,931 •:83,806 
Employee Benefits 25,t74 27,437 29,596 30,204 >f31,83i "■■' 
Services 63,722 67,869 72,340 69.914 £70,940 
Commodities 9.401 8.843 11,152 10,627 Jewess 
Capital Outlay 5.668 5,736 5,291 6,410 Mf&Ki 
Transfers: '-'' l'^'-*'    ': 
Between Operating Fun ds    7,983 8.179 7,965 7,991 fi 6,017';. 
To Capital Project Fund 8.594 13,622 10,130 . 10,130 JK9.922. : 
To Debt Service Funds 9,660 8,774 9.536 :     7,722 K,7,24!-;~. 
To Reserve Accounts 304 2,404 343 3,193 }   1,351 
Mi,84t-\ To Other Funds 2,490 1,879 2,235 1,969 
Other (306) 0 380 0 $$&£.- 
TOTAL 204.990 221.963 228,128 228,091 psjfeor: 
— DEFINITIONS: 
PERSONAL SERVICES: Services rendered by lull-time and part-time employees to support the functions 
of City departments. Costs include salaries, overtime, shift differentials, and other direct payments to 
employees. 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: Contrtoutions made by the City to designated funds to meet commitments of 
obligations for employee fringe benefits. Included are the City's share of costs for Social Security and the 
various pension, medical, and life insurance plans. 
SERVICES: The requirements for a department's work program which are provided by other entities- 
either outside vendors and contractors or other Cily departments. Examples are the costs of repair and 
maintenance services (not materials); utilities; rentals; and charges from City Internal Service Funds. 
COMMODITIES: Expendable materials and supplies necessary to carry out a department's work program 
for the fiscal year. Such items as repair and maintenance materials, chemicals, agricultural products, office 
supplies, small tools, and merchandise for resale are included. 
CAPITAL OUTLAY: The purchase, acquisition, or construction of any item having unit cost of $100 or 
more, or a useful fife of one or more years. Typical capital outlay items include vehicles, construction 
equipment, typewriters, computers, and office furniture. 
Note; This summary presents expenditures by major objects as well as interfund transfers. 
Source: Dennis Strachota, 1994. The Best of Government;! Budgeting: A Guide a Preparing Budget Documents, Chicago, IL: Government Finance 
Officers Association, Exhibit 3-13. 
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2. Detailed Line-Item Object of Expenditure by Account Format 
City of Sterling Heights, Michigan 
Account Code 









; Wlti 2*tf~ 
Account 
Number ■::■'"' ' Account Nam« 
199H992 Actual 1992-1993 Budget 1993-1994 Budget 
Dobra ■•«:.■':! ..Dollars : % :    Dollars . % 
hmonnfi S*TWC4* 
703000 Wipes-EKCI«* K Appoflled «0.516 010 «0,270 0.12 S58.1S0 C 13 
704000 W»$« i S4laM*-P*rrr.an«n( 20,871.787 41.58 21.896.400 42.9S 22.232070 42.« 
704001 S**Timt8VB«* 347.583 0.70 338.530 0.66 3M.910 C.71 
704718 VAg* R«f*buo«n*n!v7C (1.4931 (0.00) 0 0.00 0 CM 
704731 YtolUti Imurarc« Allowance 15583 0.03 19,020 004 15.500 C.33 
705»; V^oM-Sa-viffi-Tenp/Pafl am« 749.431 151 6S4.080 13« 704.210 1.35 
705001 FVl Trro/tonp ■ Non PicrUM.'* 63,096 0.13 88,720 0.13 59.530 
Toeooo VAQM-SalviM ' OccaSlOni! 47754 0.10 55,000 0.11 55500 0.1! 
70B0OO OvwVn« 1i3S,053 3.09 1.418,740  ■ 2.79 1521.240 3.51 
708001 Comptnmory Tirrw Boy BJCK 82133» 1.65 784.900 154 808.550 1.55 
7087S5 0,%1inM-F.LS.A. 0 o.oo 0 0.00 30.000 CM 
710000 Ü»>8*<«y 853,643 U1 692.890 . 1.16 620.150 1 18 
711000 Ho8d»>Piiy 477,153 0*6 530.580- 1.04 544500 104 
713500 C«rAl0w«RC7 1.500 0.00 0" 0.00 0 OK 
7I4000 Food Allcwin« «1*17 0.12 72.000 0.14 72.000 0.14 
7ISOO0 Ootlwlg ABowioc* 253.576 051 224.350 0.44 224.500 013 
717000 flCA «10.232 1.83 929.860 1.83 943.930 1.80 
717012 Mtde»/« FlCA 40.318 0X18 51,780 0.1O 56.930 0-' 
718000 Wo»k»«'» Compomai-on «34.540 1.28 286.990 056 351.920 C87 
719000 Unarcloymaffi Compenuw^ 12.048 0.02 13.570 C.03 14.550 0.C3 
770000 Fusion G*f*fal Employ«« R«t/ft. S35.931 1.06 698.400 1.37 823.830 157 
720001 Ftnvon-Pofc« and Fint R*lir«rt!en! 3,174.410 6.38 3.300540 6.48 3.691.610 7.05 
721000 HotptuAubon ,   1316.780 4.66 5503.630 5.51 3.217,010 615 
721001 Ho*rjit»l«»on-Rei*ew 255.517 Oil 289.720 0.53 S94J00 058 
721002 Rauv« Mo*d!-Pota! 4 Fir« 285.818 053 334.850 0.66 457.91C 057 j 
722000 Dtfnlaflnauance 371.887 0.75 420.970 0.83 403,930 077 1 
72300C UfelnUjrincn 106.173 0.21 116.350 0,23 85.770 0.1« 1 
724000 Epo C*r« WttJ-fflrca 1763 0.00 1.4B0 0.00 1.570 C.0C 1 
726000 Daa&hy kisunnc« 238.275 0-48 278.080 0.55 293.350 058 ! 
-IM FVraooMl SttvioM 34,602,145 . 68.56 » 38564,100- . 5U»' '   S7.9O0.IS0 7142 | 
! 
Note: This dry's budget contained four object categories: Personnel Services, Other Charges, Capital Outlay, and Transfers Out. 
Only one category is presented here. 
Source: Adapted from Derail* Strachola. 1994. The Best of Governmental Budgeting: A Guide to Preparing Budget Documents. Chicago. IL' Government 
Finance Officers Association. Exhibit 3-14. 
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APPENDIX C. EXAMPLE OF A PERFORMANCE BUDGET 
FORMAT 
City of Fod Collins. Colorado 
The program analysis - 
highlights budget 
issues and changes in 
operations from the 
prior year. It includes 




and transfers are        - 
presented for three 
budget periods. 
Personnel Format 
Shows the mix of 
positions allocated to 
this program {e.g.,   . 
hourty vs. volunteers!. 
Revenue Format 
The source of   —'"""' 
financing for this 
program is also 
displayed.   ■ 
Performance Format ■ 
These program 
objectives tot the 
budget year tie to the 
performance 
measures presented. 
Efficiency and " 
effectiveness measures 
are presented for three 
budget periods'. 
Comments Section 
CITY OF FORT COLLINS 
PROGRAU 006301      PATROL SERVICES 
FUND 101 GENERAL FUND 
DEPARTMENT     J00000      POLICE SERVICES 
PROGRAM MISSION 
To y avid« a 1J ranoe at poSce »W evt» include crimp pnyerion, tr«rK< nteonr«. mfc and corrm»-«y oroWr, »»"15. 
PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
w. w» com™. u«*5 alto-naw* raaaooa, method», aHovnoo; prornoi and «TTTCSV« napom« 10 »tarn demwt. tor a*™« >i th« i« cr-tl- 
««on» mam«.. W. ~1 000!««» 10 »nphaara probleowx.w.rf potan» YnV«, «sue» are ad<Kno«d tHrauoh «poLoScn 0! own-aolvinc 
«»MS. PKW Scr-cee' Select*. Er Wim« Uni fSEU: »U own«. 10 concentrate on ptobtar ™-x«.«v. «mir. rh. convnmty and Ihe Traffic 
Unt «« cool«, 10 «Urn, trafic-rtatnd cauo» m 1 993. In 1» «dort 10 award It* •fJC«c«OT c< p^i^-«v^ «Bom !r« lolswra avviae! 
»*Ilk« place »1693: Th* Records Leutenan: ocaijon w* mov» to Raml 10 raxwtnaie p-obfctrwniwod poteno «Hont In ad*ion Vo Cam 
FW»»-. CooroSoaw »il nv«, from Coxmuraty Afh™ to Paaol and the Crime Analyit from Racords 10 FJ« - both to be aupt^srf b. Ihr 
™ba>nvC)r»ent*d Pcacjng liaulennni Forl993.a rjAREctficffrpwIwn has l>w added 10 PYa program 
. PERSONAL SERVICES 










































































PROGRAM PERf OR.VWNCE BUDGET 
PROGRAM 00830! PATROL SERVICES 
OBJECTIVES  1. To ™t10C»olc**or.»' •equcata tor***». 
2. Continue to us* altemaltw reaponae methods to moat 
«Itectvth/ uta« awom office/*. 
 3. Maintain 1997 response ttnea. 
PROGRAM INDICATORS 
DEMAND 
1. Total Inodenta 
2. Popiahon SVwtd 
3. Incident» perl 000 Population 
WORKLOAD 
1. Daaoatched CaE» RMpooded as 
2. DiapatcherfCalbpertion^rje^viic-yrAofceOtrjcorandCSO' 
3. Deipafch«! Cafia Taken by CSO* 
PRODUCWE 
1.     Per C*pna Cost-Patrol 
EFFECTIVE 




1      « Cafe rMayKJWadcofl Mora than 5 Mnutts 












































COMMENTS * CSO a) Conrmjnity Sconce Officer 
I!^,-iT^«wr^rtTtf-4W^^ 
Note: In this cttyi the service format is used for all programs presented within the operating budget 
Soiree: Adapted from De™ Strachrjta, 1994. 7» Best of Govommcnhl Budgeting: A Guide to Preparing Budget Documents. Chi 
Government Finance Officers Association. Exhibit 2-3. icago, lU 
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APPENDIX D. NON-DEFENSE PROGRAM BUDGET FORMATS 
1. Aggregate for all Programs 




Division Within ■ 
Program Area 















Gener A! Service» 
































ADMINISTRATIVE $8.503.491 $9,188.862 $12.081.287 31.5% 
CULTURAL, UBRARY 4 RECREATIONAL 
Administration 
Cultural Service* t Fsc-Uies 
Library 

















TOTAL CULTURAL, LIBRARY 
4 RECREATIONAL 









NET OPERATING CULTURAL. UBRARY 
« RECREATIONAL $10,277,635 $10.611.619 $12,186,636 12.7% 
COMMUNITY PLANNING 4 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
Administration 


































TOTAL COMMUNITY PLANNING 
S ENVIRONMENTAL 









NET OPERATING COMMUNITY PLANNING 
4 ENVIRONMENTAL $5,058,897 $6,397,9 tO $6,857,251 7.2% 
l»r«»i>»«*Wrm:3BW-WrV»»«»tl«a»»^^ 
Note: Existing departments are clustered under broad service area (programs). Departmental lines are maintained. 
Source: Adapted from Denno Strachota.1994. Tht Best of Governmental Budgeting: A Gukto to Preparing Budget Documents. Chicago, lU 




2. For One Program 





To, protect MM Gvaa, haaMi and proparty of «1 oMzana and to tak» dlraet action and iMd 
regional •frort» to raduoa drug«, crimo, violence, and anvironmenuly uneate oondkJona. 
■es/f»              1992            is«3       Bgt% 
Program                               Statt                   Budgat              Budget           Chng. 
ffalghbortiood Security   1.004.7/9B9.0       $92,921,200      $99,320.900     4.8% 
^,   WeronOnjga                               92/80         $3.200,900         $3.119,100     -3.0% 
UtjetySyetemMgmt          4124/429.3       tS3.075.400      $98,018,900     3.7* 
Each budget category 
• subdivided into     ^^~- Protection                                     S/e       $17,288,100      $13,887,100  -194% 
"progrmie" which — 
provide* the batia for 
Toul                            1,47*2/1,474.2     $120,492,900  jj$127411.400     0.»» 
the program budget ■ Community Health and Safety la aCehlly up 04% primarily dua to adding capital 
reoouroeo lor wel Seid Impiwement». 
The long-term goal or 
Neighborhood Security 
Neighborhood 
Security program is Operating Allocation Plan 
deacribed here. tvn                1992             IBM       Bgt.% 
Activity                Dapaitmant       Stall •            Budgat             Budgat        Cfcng. 
Informationis 
1. Fit                  Hra             318/320       $16,979,000      $19,844,100          9.2% 
8uppraaaion                                      • 
activity within t IHydnmt            Water                  SO           $399,100           $372,900          6.2% 
• S.Poloe                Poka               80/62          $3,740400         $3.419,000         -84% 
"~^     Irwaatigatlona 
Notea are used to rtaSactolSpoaaionaraaaaionadtoothaf dnieiona. 
identify major         __ .— 4. Anon               Bra                     4/4           $233.100          $241.500         3.9« 
cnangeaTromone   <-~—«^_ 
budget year to the 
next 
S. Municipal           Court»         664/87.6         $2,393,100        $2,620400          9.7% 
Court 
 ^     Incajdoo judicial raviaw of criminal riaai, amall daäm and traffic oourt. Alao rofleota budgat 
inemaaa for 2 naw car» for caplaa piogram and 3 now oar» for balifF». 
subdivided into 
"acrMisa." The 





performing the activity 
Isaboisted. 
7. Human             Human«   1314/120         $9,708400        $9,970,100        4.9% 
«*-■■ -«-■»■ -■*- -       >»-L-I n.. KswMD*>UOOn      PesnO. KM. 
«•rvk» ' 
«. Potoa                Rote«           394/394       $14,931,000      $16.014,200          9,0% 
Opantiorat 
■ RtAaKts 9 nw poloc wBosw potation*) funoM by DMHA. 
9. Clerk of            Courta        964/864        $2,089400       $3,180400         $4% 
Court» 
Inofcjdaa judtaiai raviaw of criminal oaaaa, amall deine, toemc court end management. 
10. Emergency      Bra                 80/80        $2493,400        $2*17,900          84% 
Modjoal 
■ RaSaobi momaaa to purohaaa a pammed« unh. 
U.Praeeoution     Law               84/84       .   $294400          $310,900          S.8% 
ofTmfnc 
Offen»»» 
"Totals' are presented  
in boldface type to 
ntghight thsm. 
12.C*yJe«           Human*             0/0           $380,000          $980400          0u0% 
NonCL RM> 
r»    OparaenetW             14S4.7/SSU      «83,78440«      $SS,1TS4M         44* 
rlote:Prorjf»mcul8acrrjeedafpertrientW 
Management, or Environmental Piotoction sut pror/ams. 
SourwAdepM »on Dftmai Sa*ohef«1»^ 
Government Bruno» Ofcen AnonJafinn, BeSbit 2-2. 
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APPENDIX E. THE NEW MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
STRUCTURE FOR DOD AS PROPOSED BY THOMPSON (1991) 
AND THOMPSON AND JONES (1994) 
Labor markets. 
defense contractors, 
other producer; of maieriel 
and equipment, 
supply military departments 
IT 
OSD performs treasury functions: 
apportions budget authority to combatant commands, 
Issues checks to suppliers and personnel, 
provides long-term and working capital 
to military departments, etc 
Manages mlltary Buyer/Seller arrangements 
and supervises transfer pricing 
Stntejic nuclear retaliation ^^W^^^ 
Conventional defense of: 
Central Europe SSS§$$^^ 
Northern Europe (No^y etc.)  SSSSS^ 
Greece and Turkey 
Persian Gulf States 
Republic of Korea 
Pacific and Indian Oceans 
Continental United States 
Intelligence and Communications 
Advanced Research and Development 
^ 
3 
Military Departments would 
supply fully trained and equipped 
combat and support 
units to combatant commands 
Combatant commands would 
exhaust budget authority by 
acquiring combat and support 
units from military departments 
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APPENDIX F. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ESTONIAN DEFENSE 
BUDGET46 FOR 2001 AS ADOPTED BY THE PARLIAMENT 
The two-digit codes after the description of the purpose of expenditures are the 
codes of budget articles that are included in that line. Expenditures for the same budget 
articles are often divided between different chapters. 
Part 132. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
Chapter 01. Ministry of Defense47 





- Accommodation Allowance 
- Food Allowance 





Programs of the Regular Armed Forces (52) 
Total 
Aids (54) 
Aids to Social Organizations 
From that: 
- Union of the Maintenance of war Graves 
From that: 
- Restoration of the Tallinn Military Cemetery 
46 This presentation includes only expenditures included in the budget of the MoD and its sphere of 
administration. The Ministry of Interior, and even to a lesser extent other ministries, also incurs some 
defense expenditures. However, the budgets of all ministries have a similar basic structure. Therefore, 
observing only the MoD budget is not a serious limitation. 
47 Chapter 01 includes the operating expenses of the MoD itself, funds for some specific projects like 
strategic research, aid to various organizations and some other expenses such as membership fees for 
international organizations. 
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of the Regular Armed Forces 
- Restoration of the Church of Tori 
- Marking of Military Graves 
- "Erna" Organization 
- Veterans Association 
- J. Laidoner Museum 
- Restoration of the Estonian Association of Injured Soldiers 
- Fond of the Assistance of Freedom Fighters 
Membership Fees of International Organizations (57) 
Total 
Other Aids to Physical Persons (69) 
Funeral Costs 
Chapter 02. Defense Attaches 
Maintenance Costs (10, 21 and 30) 
Total 





- Accommodation Allowance 
- Food Allowance 
Medicines (42) 
Total 
Chapter 03. Information Service 
Operations (91) 
Total 
Chapter 04. Funds for Results-Oriented Management 
Salaries and Social Tax (10 and 21) 
Salaries 
Social Tax 
Chapter 10. Institutions and Organizations of the MoD48 
Maintenance Costs (10, 21 and 30) 
48 This chapter summarizes the operating budgets of organizations of auxiliary nature subordinated 







- Accommodation Allowance 





Chapter 11. Educational Institutions of the 
Regular Armed Forces49 









- Accommodation Allowance 
- Food Allowance 





Chapter 30. General (Joint) Staff of the Defense Forces50 





49 Chapter 11 includes the operating budgets of the Military Educational Establishments (for officer 
education), Combat School (for NCO training) and the Estonian part of the Baltic Defense College (for 
staff officer education) 
50 This chapter also includes the operating budget of the Army Staff, as these two institutions are 
physically located in the same building. 
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- Accommodation Allowance 





Membership Fees of International Organizations (57) 
Total 
Chapter 40. Military Units of the Regular Armed Forcessi 
Maintenance Costs (10, 21 and 30) 
Total 
Aids (26) 




- Accommodation Allowance 
- Food Allowance 





Chapter 52. NATO "Partnership for Peace Program" 
Maintenance Costs (10, 21 and 30) 
Total 
Chapter 53. Defense-Related Projects52 
Maintenance Costs (10, 21 and 30) 
Total 
Mandatory Insurance Fees (22) 
Total 
Compensations (26) 
51 Chapter 40 includes the operating budgets of most military units: six infantry training battalions, 
Artillery Group, Air Defense Training Battalion, Air Force staff, Airbase, Navy (all naval units are 
physically located in the same place), Central Depots, Reconnaissance Battalion, Signals Battalion, 
Logistics Battalion, Central Training Area and some other minor auxiliary units like Orchestra of the 
Regular Armed Forces. 
52 This chapter summarizes the operating budgets of the Peace Operations Center, of most Baltic 
projects - the Baltic Battalion BALTBAT, the Baltic Squadron BALTRON (for mine warfare), the Baltic 
Air Surveillance project BALTNET - and the costs of Estonian representatives in NATO. 
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- Accommodation Allowance 
- Food Allowance 





Medical Examination of Conscripts (44) 
Total 
Chapter 60. National Defense Departments53 





- Accommodation Allowance 
- Food Allowance 
- One-Time Aids to Conscripts 




Medical Examination of Conscripts (44) 
Total 
Defense-Related Registration in Local Governments (52) 
Total 
Chapter 81. Defense League54 
Aids (54) 
Total 
From that: for reserve training up to 
53 These organizations are directly subordinated to the MoD. Their task is to call conscripts and the 
reservists into service and they are responsible for most of the defense-related registration of people and of 
mobilization reserves. 
54 This is the part of the operating expenses of the Defense League that are allocated though the 
defense budget. Additionally, the Defense League finances part of its operations from its revenues collected 
from providing guarding and other services. 
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Chapter 91. Special Equipments and Military Clothing55 
Defense-Related Equipment, Inventory and Materials (46) 
Total for procurement 
Chapter 97. Investments of the MoD Sphere of Administration56 
Investments 
From that: Capital Repairs (73) 
Procurement of Movables (76) 
Procurement of Immovables (77) 
Chapter 98. Other Expenditures of the MoD Sphere of Administration 
Information Technology (3 7) 
Total 
Part 132 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE total expenditures 
55 This chapter summarizes most of the expenses for central MoD procurement (special equipment and 
military clothing). Additionally, the military units have the right to procure minor things from their own 
operating budgets, However, this chapter does not summarize all procurement. Procurement related to 
information technology is also given outside of this chapter in article 37 (Chapter 98), but this article also 
includes maintenance costs of computer networks. Some procurement costs are also in Chapter 97. 
56 This chapter summarizes the expenses for central procurement designated as strategically important 
for the state or the so-called National Investment Programs, or expenses designated as investment by the 
MoD. Generally, the chapter summarizes costs for procurement of" land and buildings, for capital repairs 
and construction (article 77 Procurement of Immovables) and procurement of transportation vehicles 
(article 76). It must be noted, however, that the distinction between this chapter and chapter 91 is 
sometimes fuzzy. Generally, procurement goes into chapter 91 and costs for infrastructure into chapter 97. 
However, procurement of mobilization reserves is financed from chapter 91, although this could be 
designated as investment. On the other hand, if the procurement of mobilization reserves is designated as 
strategically important for the state, then the funds may also come from chapter 97. 
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APPENDIX G. PROPOSED MISSION PACKAGES 
Package 1: Training and Education: Al, A2, Fl, F2, Nl, N2, DU, DL2, DL4 
Army Missions: 
1. Training   and   educating  personnel   to   established  standards  to   include 
inculcating strong spirit to defend the nation (Al) 
2. Conducting training for all units at designated readiness levels (A2) 
Navy Missions: 
1. Training   and  educating  personnel  to   established  standards  to   include 
inculcating a strong spirit to defend the nation (Nl) 
2. Conducting training for all units at designated readiness levels (N2) 
Air Force Missions: 
1. Training   and   educating  personnel  to   established   standards   to   include 
inculcating a strong spirit to defend the nation (Fl) 
2. Conducting training of all units at designated readiness levels (F2) 
Defense League Missions: 
1. Conducting professional training according to established tasks, conditions and 
standards (DL1) 
2. Conducting professional training according to established tasks, conditions and 
standards (DL2) 
3. According to established standards, conducting refresher training of Territorial 
Defense Units (DL4) 
Package 2: Readiness: A3, F3, N3 
Army Mission 
1. Maintaining units at designated readiness levels (A3) 
Navy Mission 
1. Maintaining units at designated readiness levels (N3) 
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Air Force Mission: 
1. Maintaining units at designated readiness levels (F3) 
Package 3: Alliances and Partnerships (this could further be classified into 
Host Nation Support and Participation in International Operations): A4, Al 1, F4, 
F9,F13,N4,N8,N9,N18 
Army Missions: 
1. Providing designated forces for combined exercises and operations with NATO 
and other partners (A4) 
2. Upon approval of the government, activating of host national support system 
for external forces (All) 
Air Force Missions: 
1. Providing designated forces for combined exercises and operations with NATO 
and other partners (F4) 
2. Participating in the development of airfields, which are interoperable with the 
standards of NATO and other partners (F9) 
3. Upon approval by the government, activating host national support system for 
external forces (F13) 
Navy Missions: 
1. Providing designated forces for combined exercises and operations with NATO 
and other partners (N4) 
2. Participating in the development of seaports that are interoperable with the 
standards of NATO and other partners (N8) 
3. Providing designated forces for naval exercises and operations with NATO and 
other partners (N9) 
4. Upon approval of the government, activating the host nation support system for 
external forces (N18) 
Package 4: Mobilization and Deployment (Transition to War): A7, A8, A9, 
A10, F10, Fl 1, F12, F14, Nl 1, N13, N14, N15, N16, DL5, DL6 
Army Missions: 
1. Transition to wartime command structure (A7) 
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2. Increasing readiness levels of designated units through intensifying training and 
exercising wartime tasks in case of crises (A8, alternatively Programs 1 or 2)) 
3. By  direction  of the  Parliament/President,   mobilizing  designated  forces 
according to plans and standards (A9) 
4. Integrating the ground units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in case of crises 
(MO) 
Navy Missions: 
1. Leading and intensifying maritime surveillance (in transition to war) (Nl 1) 
2. Integrating designated maritime units from other ministries and civilian assets 
in times of crises (N13) 
3. Transition to wartime command structure in case of crises (N14) 
4. Increasing readiness levels of designated units through intensifying training and 
exercising wartime tasks in times of crises (N15, alternatively Programs 1 or 2) 
5. During transition to war, and during wartime, conducting search and rescue 
(N16, alternatively Program 6) 
Air Force Missions: 
1. Transition to wartime command structure in case of crises (F10) 
2. Increasing readiness levels of designated units through intensifying training and 
exercising wartime tasks in times of crises (Fl 1, alternatively Programs 1 or 2) 
3. Integrating air units from Ministry of Internal Affairs and civilian air assets in 
times of crises (F12) 
4. Providing air traffic management (transition to war) (F14, alternatively 
Program 8) 
Defense League Missions: 
1. Assisting in mobilization (DL5) 
2. Assisting in forming national defense units (transition to war) (DL6) 
Package 5: Wartime operations: A5, A12, A13, A14, F15, F16, F17, N6, N12, 
N17, N19, N20, DL5, DL6, DL7, DL8, DL9 
Army Missions: 
1. Conducting coastal defense (A5) 
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2. As directed by lawful authorities, providing ground forces to defend national 
territorial integrity (A 12) 
3. Conducting joint/combined operations (Al 3. This seemed to be the best place 
for this mission, although this mission covers almost every program. In this sense 
its place is disputable) 
4. Maintaining essential interior lines of communications (A14) 
Navy Missions: 
1. Providing designated forces for coastal defense (N6) 
2. Preparing for the defense of strategically important assets from the sea (N12) 
3. Supporting the operations of defense forces with naval assets (N17) 
4. Sea denial around strategic locations in wartime (N19) 
5. Securing sea lines of communication in territorial waters (N20) 
Air Force Missions: 
1. Conducting air operations, including air defense, in support of defense forces 
(F15) 
2. Conducting combined and joint air operations (F16) 
3. Combat Search and Rescue (F17) 
Defense League Missions: 
1. Forming the territorial defense units at designated readiness levels (DL7) 
2. Through absorption of designated units and individuals into national defense 
organization, participating in the defense of the country (DL8) 
3. Providing remaining Defense League assets to support national defense (DL9) 
Package 6: Defense Support to Civil Authorities: A6, F8, N10, N16, DL3 
Army Mission: 
1. Lending designated forces, as stated in legislation, to civilian authorities in 
natural disasters, civil unrest or man-made catastrophes (A6) 
Navy Missions: 
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1. Conducting maritime search and rescue operations (peacetime) (N10) 
2. During transition to war, and during wartime, conducting search and rescue 
(N16) 
Air Force Mission 
1. Providing designated forces for national search and rescue operations (F8) 
Defense League Mission: 
1. Assisting civilian authorities in natural disasters or man-made catastrophes 
(DL3) 
Package 7: Monitoring and Control over Airspace and Territorial Waters: 
F5, F6, F7, N5, N7 
Navy Missions: 
1. Conducting maritime military surveillance (N5) 
2. Conducting naval operations (N7) 
Air Force Missions: 
1. In peacetime, providing air traffic management (F5) 
2. Developing the air situation picture (F6) 
3. Conducting air policing (F7) 
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